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Insuring Corporate Crime
MIRIAM HECHLER BAER*
Corporate criminal liability has become an important and much-talked about topic.
This Article argues that entity-based liability-particularly the manner in which it is
currently applied by the federal government---creates social costs in excess of its
benefits. To help companies better deter employee crime, the Article suggests the
abolition of entity-wide criminal liability, and in its place, the adoption ofan insurance
system, whereby carriers would examine corporate compliance programs, estimate the
risk that a corporation's employees would commit crimes, and then charge companies
for insuring those risks. The insurance would cover civil penalties associated with the
entity's employee-related criminal conduct. Part I begins with a discussion of
corporate criminal liability and the costs that accrue from the manner in which it has
been implemented by the Department ofJustice. Part II examines several proposals to
change corporate criminal liability, and explains why most of these proposals would
barely alter the current structure. Part III lays out the proposal for an insurance
system in lieu of entity-based criminal liability and explains, in rough form, how
corporate entities might contract for insurance, how claims might be filed, and how
damages might be measured. Part III also addresses a number of arguments that
others might raise against the proposal.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 1909, federal courts have widely accepted the maxim that corporate
organizations may be held vicariously liable for their employees' crimes. 1 There is far
less consensus, however, that corporate liability deters crime.2This Article suggests
that corporate criminal liability inherently encourages entities to overpay for their
employees' actual and feared criminal conduct. Because the current corporate criminal
liability standard is so broad and the collateral consequences of a criminal indictment
are so devastating, entities will attempt to avoid formal charges ex ante by investing in
"compliance" products intended to impress prosecutors in the future, even if these
programs are more costly than effective.3 Risk averse corporate managers may further
attempt to avoid entity-based criminal liability by declining otherwise beneficial
investments simply because they seem too risky.4
1. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493-94 (1909)
(explaining that it is "well established" that in actions for tort, corporations are responsible for
the actions of their agents).
2. See, e.g., Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability:
Containing the Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 ARIz. L. REv. 933 (2005)
(embracing deterrence rationale and proposing a "three strikes" death penalty approach towards
corporations whose employees violate the law); Michael L. Seigel, Corporate America Fights
Back: The Battle over Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 B.C. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (2008)
("corporate culpability achieves significant additional deterrence, specific and general, beyond
that achieved solely by the prosecution of individuals"). But see Preet Bharara, Corporations
Cry Uncle and their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate
Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 53, 113 (2007) (accepting general premise that corporate
criminal liability deters wrongdoing but arguing for narrower standard of liability); Daniel R.
Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1996) (questioning
theoretical necessity of criminal liability as means of achieving deterrence); Gilbert Geis &
Joseph F. C. DiMento, Empirical Evidence and the Legal Doctrine of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 29 AM J. CRiM. L. 341 (2002) (calling for empirical testing of efficacy of corporate
criminal liability); Vikamaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does
it Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1477, 1478 & n.2 (1996) (criticizing analysis of corporate criminal
liability and citing earlier critiques and defenses).
3. See Julie O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal "Code" Is a Disgrace: Obstruction Statutes
as a Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMiNOLoGY 643,668 (2006) ("it is difficult to find a case
in which a corporation cannot be tagged for the activities of its agents"); Andrew Weissman, A
New Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1319, 1320-21 (2007)
(observing that even minimal employee conduct will trigger corporate-level liability). For a
discussion of the collateral consequences of corporate indictment, see discussion infra at 28-29
n. 144-49, and Erik Paulsen, Note, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate
Prosecution Agreements, 82 NYUL. REv. 1434, 1453-54 (2007). For a discussion of costs and
inefficiencies encountered in compliance programs, see infra at 23-26.
4. Cf Seigel, supra note 2, at 12-13 (observing-without apparent criticism-that
uncertainty inherent in corporate criminal law "undoubtedly makes corporate officers much
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Once the government learns that a corporation's employee has violated the law,
companies will "pay" far more than investing in showy compliance products to avoid a
corporate indictment.5 This is so because the costs of a criminal indictment to a
corporate entity are so great and because the corporation's legal liability for its
employees' crimes is so broad.6 Indeed, as a legal matter, the government may convict
the entity for nearly any employee crime, provided the employee was acting within the
"scope of his authority" and acted with "an" intention to help the company, even if the
employee was violating express directions or corporate policies.7 As a result, the
company whose employee (or even some unidentified group of employees) commits a
crime will have few legal defenses to protect it from an indictment, much less a
conviction. 8
This reality creates a massive bargaining imbalance between corporations and
prosecutors, which in turn generates numerous inefficiencies. On one hand, depending
on the industry in which the corporation operates, the return of an indictment from a
grand jury will wreak serious havoc on the organization, and cause massive
dislocations up to and including its death.9 Therefore, any corporation who comes
within the purview of a federal investigation will do just about anything to avoid a
criminal indictment.
On the other hand, the federal prosecutors who administer the corporate criminal
justice system have lots of leverage, but little incentive to reach an efficient
arrangement with corporate entities. Instead, prosecutors who lack the information and
expertise to efficiently identify and correct compliance risks within corporations will
nevertheless demand monitoring and reporting regimes (and sometimes ancillary
payments that have little or no connection' 0 to the underlying crime) without critically
evaluating the costs and benefits of those regimes or their effect on the integrity of the
corporation. "
Prosecutors will extract even greater concessions when they consider the
corporation's expost cooperation in identifying and assisting in the prosecution of its
current and former employees. Because the prosecutor operates in a culture that pushes
for maximum indictments and penalties, she will demand that the entity become a
surrogate policeman for the government in exchange for leniency.' 2 As a result,
more risk averse"). For a more negative view of liability-fueled risk aversion, see Assaf
Hamdani, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1677, 1679 (2007) (arguing that
liability imposed on lawyers, accountants, and directors for failing to prevent misconduct may
cause risk aversion "particularly since they act on behalf of third parties and therefore do not
bear the full costs of taking precautionary measures or making conservative decisions").
5. See discussion infra at 33-34 (discussing costs of corporate cooperation).
6. See supra note 4.
7. See discussion infra at 15 and notes 81-85.
8. Id. See also Weissman, supra note 3, at 1320 (observing that "minimal" employee
conduct will trigger entity liability).
9. "[A]n indictment-especially of a financial services firm-threatens to destroy the
business regardless of whether the firm ultimately is convicted or acquitted." United States v.
Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see also Weissman, supra note 3, at 1321.
10. See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecutions, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 916
(2007) (describing four recent agreements that required the corporate defendant to make
payments to entities that were unconnected to the underlying harm).
11. For a discussion of monitoring regimes, see infra at 35-38.
12. See Garrett, supra note 10, at 899.
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corporations-both those suspected of wrongdoing and those who adopt measures
ostensibly to avoid similar wrongdoing-are likely to adopt measures that undermine
employee trust and loyalty.
The end result of this process (assuming the corporation successfully avoids
indictment) is the government's provision of either a deferred or non-prosecution
agreement (collectively referred to as DPAs in this Article) that will likely require it to
pay fines, provide extensive assistance in the prosecution of individual employees, and
agree to costly monitoring and reporting provisions.' 3
DPAs (and the process that precedes their implementation) affect not only
individual corporate signatories, but also those other corporations in similar industries
or otherwise similar circumstances to adopt programs that they think will please
prosecutors should they ever become the subject of a criminal investigation. 14 The
actual number of corporate prosecutions and DPAs may appear small (and the number
of indictments even smaller), but their corresponding effect on onlooker corporations is
far more significant. 1
5
Despite the government's increasingly aggressive threats of corporate prosecution
over the last decade, along with its extraction of numerous concessions through DPAs,
there is little evidence that employee compliance across firms has increased. 16
Although DPAs may soften the most visible costs of indictment, they may in fact exact
many other costs on corporate shareholders, yet in a far less visible manner. ' 7
Although complaints about the corporate criminal justice system have been building
over the last decade 18 (particularly, the government's practice '9 of requiring corporate
13. See infra at 29-38.
14. As of July 31, 2006, the Department of Justice had announced twelve deferred
prosecution agreements for the year. Sue Reisinger, Deal-Making by DOJIs on the Rise, NAT'L
L.J., July 31, 2006, at 8. Since 1992, over forty pre-trial agreements have been documented and
reported by either the Department of Justice or individual United States Attorneys' Offices.
Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The Department of
Justice's Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1,2 fig. 1 (2006). Whereas DPAs
prior to 1999 were fairly simple settlements that called for fines and limited corporate reforms,
today's DPAs require, among other things: outside monitors and extensive reporting; the
corporate defendant's promise to prohibit its employees from contradicting factual statements
contained in the DPA; and waiver of the attorney-client privilege. See Garrett, supra note 10, at
853 (discussing increase in corporate prosecutions that seek far-reaching "structural reforms" in
lieu of indictments); Finder & McConnell, supra, at 5-7, 17-19.
15. See infra at 31-32.
16. Despite the federal government's increased prosecution of corporate entities and
defendants, corporate crime (particularly, corporate fraud, which is one of the key forms of
criminal conduct in the white collar context) remains a significant problem across thousands of
organizations. See KPMG FoRENSIc, KPMG FoRENsIC FRAUD SURVEY 2003 at 2, available at
http://www.us.kpmg.com/RutUS-prod/Documents/9/FINALFraudSur.pdf (reports of employee
fraud increasing even though organizations are "responding with anti-fraud" measures);
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2005 GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRIME STUDY: US AND NORTH AMERICA
4, available at http://www.pwc.com (follow "publications" hyperlink) [hereinafter PWC 2005
REPORT] (economic crime is "pervasive" throughout North American companies despite
increased reliance on internal controls and audits).
17. See infra at 35.
18. See, e.g., JoHN HASNAS, TRAPPED: WHEN ACTING ETHICALLY Is AGAINST THE LAW
(2006) (corporate criminal liability results in unethical conduct); Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting
1038 [Vol. 83:1035
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entities to waive the attorney-client privilege over communications between employees
and corporate counsel in exchange for leniency), the frustration with the corporate
criminal process appeared to reach a boiling point in 2006. This occurred when the
Honorable Lewis Kaplan, a district judge in the Southern District of New York,
concluded in United States v. Stein that the United States Attorney's Office in
Manhattan had violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of several KPMG
employees. The government did this by threatening KPMG, the huge accounting firm,
with indictment unless it reversed its former policy of advancing attorneys fees to
current and former employee-targets of the government's criminal investigation of
abusive tax shelters 20 that KPMG had widely implemented and marketed. 21 By forcing
Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the ArthurAndersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107
(2006) (arguing that costs of corporate prosecutions often outweigh benefits); Fischel & Sykes,
supra note 2, at 319 (arguing that civil liability more efficiently deters corporate conduct than
criminal liability); Khanna, supra note 2, at 1477 (same); William S. Laufer, Corporate
Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1999)
(criticizing liability scheme's emphasis on compliance programs); Shayne Kennedy, Note,
Probation and the Failure to Optimally Deter Corporate Misconduct, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075
(1998) (arguing that civil fines would more effectively deter misconduct than probationary
sentences envisioned by the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines).
19. For criticism of the waiver issue generally, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT
OF ABA TASK FORCE ON ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 1 (2006), available at
http://www.abanet.orgfbuslaw/attomrneyclient/materials/hod/emprights-report-adopted.pdf
[hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE REPORT] (emphasizing unanimous support for Resolution Ill
opposing further erosion of attorney-client privilege); Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer,
Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection, N.Y.L.J. Nov. 1, 2005, at 3
(pointing out efforts by the ABA and SEC to prevent the erosion of corporate attorney-client
privilege); Lynnley Browning, Ex-Officials of Justice Dept. Oppose Prosecutors' Tactic in
Corporate Criminal Cases, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 7, 2006, at Cl (describing letter from Kenneth
Starr and Richard Thornburgh to the Justice Department criticizing government's request for
privilege waivers in corporate prosecutions). On December 11, 2006, in response to threatened
legislation and criticism of prosecutorial practices, the Department of Justice promulgated new
guidelines for prosecutors. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, to
United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memo].
The McNulty Memo requires prosecutors to classify potentially privileged material into two
categories and then seek approval from the Department of Justice prior to seeking the material.
For a defense of the government's procedure of obtaining waivers, see George M. Cohen, Of
Coerced Waiver, Government Leverage, and Corporate Loyalty: The Holder, Thompson and
McNulty Memos and Their Critics, 93 VA. L. REV. (IN BRIEF) 137 (2007) (contending that
unwillingness to waive privilege is simply a manifestation of corporate management's attempt
at "saving their own necks").
20. As described by the court, the scheme:
allegedly involved at least four separate tax shelter vehicles, called FLIP, OPIS,
BLIPS, and SOS, designed to generate phony tax losses through a series of sham
transactions. The conspirators allegedly sought to protect their clients from
potential IRS penalties by paying co-defendant Raymond Ruble, a New York tax
attorney, to issue opinion letters falsely representing that the tax shelters were
likely to survive IRS review.
United States v. Stein, 488 F. Supp. 2d 350, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
21. United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330,338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Pursuant to
revised prosecutorial guidelines contained in the memorandum issued in the McNulty Memo of
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KPMG to withdraw financial support for its employees' defenses, the government
effectively reduced the individual defendants' ability to defend what had been
characterized as the largest tax prosecution in history.
In a separate opinion, Judge Kaplan found that the prosecution also had pressured
KPMG to coerce its employees to speak with government agents during the course of
their investigation. 22 Under a policy that KPMG drafted (and the government
approved), employees who cooperated with government agents and provided adequate
assistance would have the benefit of private attorneys representing them, paid for by
KPMG.23 Those who declined to speak by exercising their Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination or who provided less than complete information, however,
would risk termination and be solely responsible for their legal representation.24 In
July of 2006, Judge Kaplan found that this agreement violated the individual
employees' constitutional rights and suppressed several employee statements. 25 One
year later, on July 17, 2007, the court dismissed the indictment against thirteen of the
sixteen individual KPMG defendants, concluding that the government had used its
overall leverage over KPMG to interfere not only with the individual defendants'
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, but also their rights to be defended
by the counsel of their choice.
26
Many will wonder if the KPMG episode is a singular example of one court
punishing what it perceived as prosecutorial overreaching, or in fact is the harbinger of
a sea change in the way prosecutors and corporate defendants do business. The former
option seems more likely. Since Judge Kaplan laid out his initial criticisms in Stein I
and II, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has revised its internal prosecutorial guidelines
in a manner that is marginally more pro-defendant.2 7 However, neither Judge Kaplan's
December 2006, prosecutors may no longer consider the payment of an employee's attorney
fees as reason for an indictment except in extraordinary circumstances. See McNulty Memo,
supra note 19, at 11 (stating that "[p]rosecutors generally should not take into account whether a
corporation is advancing attorneys' fees to employees or agents under investigation and
indictment").
22. Kaplan suppressed several of the KPMG employees' statements. United States v. Stein
(Stein I/), 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
23. Stein L 435 F. Supp. at 345-47.
24. "In other words, KPMG told its personnel that it would cut off payment of legal
expenses of any employee who refused to talk to the government or who invoked the Fifth
Amendment." Stein II, 440 F. Supp. at 318.
25. Stein II, 440 F. Supp. at 319.
26. United States v. Stein (Stein I1), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390,414 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (criticizing
the government's "willingness ... to use their life and death power over KPMG to induce
KPMG to coerce its personnel to bend to the government's wishes notwithstanding the fact that
the Constitution barred the government from doing directly what it forced KPMG to do for it").
Previously, the court had attempted to remedy the situation by suppressing the coerced
employee statements and by authorizing and taking ancillary jurisdiction over a civil suit
between the former employees and KPMG over the attorney fee payments. United States v.
Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d 230, 242-43 (2006), vacated, Stein v. KPMG, 486 F.3d 753 (2d Cir.
2007) (holding that the district court had no jurisdiction).
27. See McNulty Memo, supra note 19. The McNulty Memo in part arose in response to
proposed legislation authored by Arlen Specter that would make it illegal for prosecutors to
request a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of
2006, S. 30, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/
documents/WSJjthompsonmemoleg.pdf.
1040 [Vol. 83:1035
INSURING CORPORATE CRIME
decision nor the revised Department policy significantly changes the status quo. 28 The
revised policy increases the administrative hurdle of requesting privileged material
from corporate targets and discourages prosecutors from blatantly punishing
corporations for advancing attorneys fees to employee-targets.29 The new internal
policy does not, however, alter the respondeat superior rule that has thrived in the
organizational criminal context. Nor does it eliminate the collateral consequences of
indictment. Accordingly, corporate entities will continue to enact compliance programs
of questionable value and cut agreements with prosecutors that threaten to impose
unnecessary costs on shareholders and society. 30 Federal prosecutors, meanwhile, will
continue to use their power to regulate and rely on corporate entities to leverage their
prosecutions of individual employees.
Instead of tweaking the current system of corporate criminal liability, this Article
sets forth a more far-reaching proposal. In place of entity-based criminal liability, I
propose a system of civil liability paired with "compliance insurance." In place of
prosecutors, insurance carriers would encourage organizations to monitor and police
their employees through privately negotiated insurance policies. Carriers would set
yearly premiums that would reflect the carriers' assessment of the risk that a given
company's employees would violate the law in the course of their employment, and
corporations would pay and disclose these premiums to their shareholders. Prosecutors
would continue to prosecute individual employees aggressively for criminal conduct.
On the entity level, however, employee crime would ordinarily trigger a civil pay-out
to either private or government victims. 3 1 This system would maintain incentives for
businesses to monitor and deter employee misconduct; preserve funds for restitution;
remove uncertainty and waste from corporate monitoring efforts; and reduce
inefficiencies caused by excess prosecutorial discretion.32 This Article argues that even
if it is politically impossible to achieve, its benefit-and its stark contrast to the system
currently in place-suggests that scholars and policymakers may be unnecessarily
overlooking the value of insurance-based incentives in deterring corporate crime.
28. Judge Kaplan's attempts at reform were made moot when the Second Circuit found a
lack of ancillary jurisdiction over the KPMG attorneys' fees dispute. The Second Circuit took
no position on Kaplan's previous conclusion that the DOJ had violated the employees' rights to
counsel by placing pressure on KPMG to withhold payments for attorneys fees. See KPMG, 486
F.3d at 753. Another court criticized the attorneys fees policy as "unquestionably obnoxious."
United States v. Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 721, 737 (E.D. Va. 2007).
29. See McNulty Memo, supra note 19, at 11.
30. According to several studies, corporate crime has increased in the last five years. PWC
2005 REPORT, supra note 16, at 4 (explaining that "[e]conomic crime is a pervasive and growing
threat to US and North American businesses of all types"). According to the PWC Report,
internal controls fail to detect economic crime approximately sixty percent of the time. Id. at 16.
31. To the extent entities were already the subject of civil lawsuits, the system simply
would ensure that the entity's insurance paid for the costs of its employees' wrongdoing,
regardless of whether that wrongdoing was labeled "criminal."
32. This Article focuses primarily on federal criminal prosecutions. I intend the term
"corporate criminal liability" to encompass prosecutions of all legitimate business entities
(corporations, partnerships, associations, and other unincorporated organizations). The concerns
discussed in this Article do not apply to entities created solely for the purpose of masking
criminal conduct.
2008]
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Part I of this Article explains how the practice of corporate criminal liability causes
corporate entities to overpay for leniency and compliance. Entity-based criminal
liability is administered by federal prosecutors empowered by their investigatory
authority, their charging discretion, and the broad standard of corporate criminal
liability.33 Corporate liability is often described as a composite system because it
combines elements of strict and negligence-based liability. 34 On one hand, virtually all
business organizations can be held vicariously liable for crimes committed by their
employees in the course of their employment. 35 Organizations, however, can avoid
liability or reduce their punishment significantly by demonstrating to prosecutors that
they meet certain compliance and cooperation standards set forth by the DOJ.36
Because the "cost" of indictment is so high, most corporate defendants will seek
mitigation. Moreover, corporations who have yet to be accused of any type of
wrongdoing will adopt methods and programs believed to be useful in avoiding
corporate crime and favored by DOJ prosecutors, in the event criminal conduct is later
detected. 7
The problem with the composite system is that its mitigation rules are too vague and
are administered and drafted by persons who lack the requisite information and
incentives to set compliance and cooperation at efficient levels. As Part I explains,
corporate organizations adopt internal policies that may or may not justify their costs. 38
To the extent organizations spend money on programs whose costs exceed their
productivity, society is harmed.
Part II explores and analyzes several groups of reforms, including proposals to alter
the liability standard,39 place greater evidentiary burdens on prosecutors during the
33. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 183 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[Tlhe executive
branch 'has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case...
." (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974))); see also Jennifer Arlen &
Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability
Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 687,688 (1997) (explaining that the corporate liability standard is
"far reaching").
34. See, e.g., Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 33, at 688; Vikamaditya S. Khanna, Corporate
Liability Standards: When Should Corporations Be Held Criminally Liable?, 37 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 1239 (2000); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-
Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 571, 581-83 (2005).
35. See discussion infra at 15.
36. See discussion infra at 22-27.
37. See Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate
Compliance with the Law, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 71, 72 (2002).
38. See Howard W. Goldstein, When the Government Ends a Deferred Prosecution Pact,
N.Y. L. J., May 4, 2006, at 5 (explaining that from the point of view of "the corporate target, a
deferred prosecution agreement-no matter how harsh and intrusive the terms-is frequently an
offer the company simply cannot refuse when the alternative is possibly death or less drastic,
but nonetheless severe, consequences"); Langevoort, supra note 37, at 74 (concluding that
overestimates of the reliability of in-house monitoring combined with underestimates of the
costs of third-party audits "biases the legal response towards insisting on too much auditing,
forcing unnecessarily costly compliance initiatives").
39. See Ainslie, supra note 18, at 110 (listing four suggested reforms); Samuel W. Buell,
The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IN. L.J. 473, 530-32 (2006) (suggesting
that the criminal prosecution of corporations should be limited to situations where the agent's
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investigation stage,4° monitor prosecutors, 41 and eliminate corporate criminal liability
altogether.42 With the exception of the final category, none of these reforms are likely
to achieve significant gains in efficiency.
Part m therefore proposes a different type of solution to the overpayment problem.
In place of corporate criminal liability, I propose "compliance insurance," a new
insurance product that would return much of entity-based liability to the realm of tort,
where it belongs.43 This idea also builds on a growing body of literature that has begun
to explore the link between insurance and corporate governance. 44
As set forth in this Article, this would be an opt-in program whereby the private
insurance market would sell "compliance insurance" to business organizations wishing
to escape the current corporate criminal rules of respondeat superior. Insurance would
cover losses stemming from employees' violations of federal and state laws and
regulations. Although current state laws prohibit insurance policies from covering
intentional misconduct, compliance insurance would cover the entity's vicarious risk,
subject to certain exceptions discussed infra.
Compliance insurance would not replace Director and Officer (D&O) insurance.
Nor would it replace or alter individual criminal prosecutions. Officers, directors, and
employees would remain civilly and criminally liable for monetary penalties arising
from their criminal misconduct. Organizations, however, would not be subject to
criminal liability, so long as they obtained a minimum level of insurance, paid their
premiums, and complied with their policies.
In this idealized world, insurance carriers would play a role similar to auditors,
analysts, and lawyers and other corporate "gatekeepers. 45 However, rather than
action is the result of institutional influence).
40. Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L. J. 1743, 1758
(2005).
41. Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLuM. L. REv. 1863, 1896-
1904 (2005).
42. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 2, at 319.
43. Even in the tort context, the wisdom of corporate vicarious liability has been
questioned. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of Employer
Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1739, 1749-1754 (1996) (criticizing fairness-based
explanations for vicarious liability).
44. Professors Ronen and Cunningham have proposed and elaborated on an insurance
scheme that would replace auditor liability for misstatements or omissions later found in public
companies' financial statements. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The
Financial Statement Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REv. 413 (2004);
Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP Re-Visited, 8
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 39 (2002). Professor Griffith has also argued for mandatory disclosure of
directors' and officers' policies as a market signal. Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper:
Why the SEC Should Mandate Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors' and Officers'
Liability Insurance Policies, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1147 (2006) (calling for mandatory disclosure
of officers' and directors' policies because policies can signal market on strength of
corporation's internal governance mechanisms).
45. Gatekeepers have been described as persons who use their reputation capital to bridge
the gap between investors and corporate managers. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure
and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REv. 301,308 (2004)
[hereinafter Coffee, Gatekeeper Reform]; John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About
the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1405 (2002) (describing gatekeepers as
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placing their reputations at risk, carriers would place their actual capital at risk and
would be less susceptible to capture.
I. How BusINEssm OVERPAY FOR CORPORATE CRIME
The following Part examines how public corporations have come to occupy a
position whereby they overpay, in terms of compliance costs and over-deterrence, for
the prosecutorial leniency necessary for smoothing the potentially huge disruptions
caused by entity-based criminal liability.
Entities were not always subject to criminal liability. Until the 1800s, courts agreed
that corporate criminal liability could not exist because corporations lacked the
requisite intent to be held morally culpable for their employees' conduct.4 The
watershed case that established criminal respondeat superior liability for intent-based
crimes was New York Central.47 In New York Central, the Supreme Court upheld the
provision of the Elkins Act that held that corporations could be prosecuted for their
employees' failure to comply with the tariffs set by the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC).48 Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that common law
did not recognize corporate criminal liability, it nevertheless reasoned that, "we go
only a step farther," by extending vicarious tort liability to criminal violations.
49
Otherwise, the Court reasoned, "many offenses might go unpunished and acts be
committed in violation of law ...."50
The fear that offenses "might go unpunished" absent criminal liability is obsolete.
5 1
State and federal governments now possess tremendous regulatory and purchasing
power over much of the business world.52 Nevertheless, over the years, most
"reputational intermediates"). Sean J. Griffith has referred to insurance carriers as "accidental
gatekeepers," since their primary intent is to assess risk and not to provide information to
investors. Griffith, supra note 44, at 1150.
46. By the mid-1800s, some courts permitted criminal prosecution of municipal
corporations for failing to maintain public bridges or highways. See Ainslie, supra note 18, at
110-11; Laufer, supra note 18, at 1361. Under English common law:
well into the 1800s-the corporation could not be indicted at all unless it created a
nuisance by failing to perform a public duty. "Prosecution" in such instances was
not viewed as a criminal proceeding, but as a means of ensuring that duties
imposed by charter or statute were carried out. Most cases involved a failure to
repair highways or bridges, or to keep navigable waterways clear. Not until the
1840s-just as the corporation was becoming intertwined in the daily lives of
ordinary men and women-was it held that corporations could be prosecuted
criminally for malfeasance, at least when nonviolent misdemeanors were charged.
Lawrence Mitchell Rothman, Life After Doe? Self-Incrimination and Business Documents, 56
U. CNi. L. Rnv. 387, 403 n.82 (1987) (citations omitted).
47. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
48. Id. at 494. The railroad company was charged with payment of an illegal rebate. Id. at
489.
49. Id. at 494.
50. Id. at 495.
51. See Pamela H. Bucy, Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: The Cart Before the
Horse, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 340 (1993) (describing the Court's reasoning as "flawed and
outdated").
52. See Greenblum, supra note 41, at 1885-89 (explaining that the government may seek
civil fines or forfeiture; freeze the offender's assets; obtain cease and desist orders; withdraw
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legislators have reacted to well-publicized instances of corporate fraud (e.g. Enron and
Worldcom) and inadequate monitoring (e.g. Arthur Andersen) by increasing criminal
sanctions in the wake of each new wave of scandals.53 Over the last hundred years,
individual federal criminal liability for individuals 54 and corporate criminal liability in
general have significantly expanded to include misconduct that previously had fallen
either within the realm of tort law or under state or local control. 55 Accordingly, as the
field of criminal law expands, all organizations must contend with the consequences of
criminal liability.
In addition to expanded federal criminal liability, the last three decades have
produced a systemic proliferation in corporate compliance programs tasked with
monitoring organizational compliance in an expanding regulatory field.56 Compliance
programs in turn, have generated and sustained an entire new industry of so-called
experts: lawyers, accountants, and other consultants who draft corporate codes, staff
corporate ethics offices and whistleblower hotlines, create corporate-wide training
programs, and assist corporate security officers in increasingly complex internal
investigations.57 At their best, corporate compliance programs can reduce and identify,
but not necessarily eliminate, employee crime.
A. The Powers of the Federal Prosecutor
As a result of the trend in federal criminalization of previously civil and regulatory
misconduct, business entities are particularly prone to prosecution by federal
58prosecutors. Federal prosecutors, in turn, possess significantly broader powers than
necessary licenses or permits; and/or cancel government contracts and debar or disqualify the
offender from contracting to supply future business to government agencies).
53. Vikamaditya S. Khanna, Corporate Crime Legislation: A Political Economy Analysis,
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 95, 95 (2004) ("[M]ost corporate crime legislation arises when there is a large
public outcry over a series of corporate scandals during or around a downturn in the
economy.").
54. See Robert A. Creamer, Criminal Law Concerns for Civil Lawyers, FED. LAW., May
2005, at 34, 35 (citing the thirteen federal criminal statutes that are most often invoked against
individuals in white-collar cases). Unlike common law fraud, which required a showing of loss
caused by a particular false statement, the federal mail and wire fraud statutes require only the
use of the mails or interstate wires and a scheme to defraud a person of property or the
intangible right to another person's honest services. HASNAS, supra note 18, at 12 (concluding
that the federal fraud statutes "authorize the punishment of almost any kind of dishonest or
deceptive behavior, even when no other party has suffered any harm").
55. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 202 (1991).
56. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits oflnternal Controls to
Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 280 (2004) (noting the recent increase in
corporate compliance programs).
57. See Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of "Law Consultants, " 75 FoRD. L. REV. 1397
(2006). Compliance programs first surfaced in response to the Federal Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA), which required compliance officers to educate corporate employees on the illegality of
bribing foreign officers. Rebecca Walker, The Evolution of the Law of Corporate Compliance in
the United States: A Brief Overview, 1561 PLI/CoRP 13 (2006). Later scandals in the defense
contracting, health care, and securities industries prompted further rounds of internal controls.
Id.
58. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
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their civil and local counterparts. 59 They may serve grand jury subpoenas on any entity
within the United States for documents. 60 The "grand jury's" document requests
(which in reality are guided substantially by the prosecutor) are restrained by few rules
of relevancy or evidence.
61
Prosecutors also may compel witnesses to testify at trial or before a grand jury. 62 If
those witnesses refuse to speak, prosecutors may immunize those witnesses and seek
contempt orders and imprisonment if the witnesses persist in their silence. 63 If the
prosecutor fears that a business entity will destroy evidence of criminal wrongdoing,
she may obtain a search warrant, instruct federal agents to seize that evidence, and, if
necessary, investigate and prosecute the entity and its employees for obstruction of
justice. 64
While federal prosecutors have great powers to compel others to produce evidence,
they have relatively few disclosure obligations of their own. 65 The grand jury need not
identify the purpose for which the document or testimony is sought. 66 The affidavit
Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1880 (1992) (explaining the
vulnerability of corporations to be a result of "the common statutory pattern in the United States
for a statute establishing an administrative agency to provide that any willful violation of the
rules adopted by the agency constitutes a federal felony"). For a more general discussion of
over-criminalization and legislators' political incentives to err on the side of greater criminal
liability than necessary, see William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice,
119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 802-07 (2006).
59. See Pamela H. Bucy, Moral Messengers: Delegating Prosecutorial Power, 59 SMUL.
REV. 321, 327 (2006) (noting that states have lagged behind the federal government in passing
aggressive laws).
60. Id. at 321 (discussing broad prosecutorial subpoena power). Unless protected by the
attorney-client privilege or work product doctrines, entities must produce the documents
specified in the grand jury subpoena. See id. They may not rely on the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43,74 (1906); HASNAS, supra
note 18, at 27.
61. United States v. R. Enters., 498 U.S. 292, 298 (1991) (emphasizing that rules and
restrictions that apply at trial do not apply to grand jury proceedings); see also Niki Kuckes, The
Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004)
(criticizing pretense that grand jury is independent from federal prosecutor).
62. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767-68 (2003) ("It is well established that the
government may compel witnesses to testify at trial or before a grand jury, on pain of contempt,
so long as the witness is not the target of the criminal case in which he testifies.").
63. See id. at 768 ("Even for persons who have a legitimate fear that their statements may
subject them to criminal prosecution, we have long permitted the compulsion of incriminating
testimony so long as those statements (or evidence derived from those statements) cannot be
used against the speaker in any criminal case."); Bucy, supra note 51, at 341 (discussing broad
prosecutorial power to grant immunity).
64. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (authorizing search warrants); 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2000)
(criminalizing obstruction of justice in federal investigations); 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (2000)
(criminalizing obstruction of state or local investigations); 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Supp. V 2005)
(criminalizing destruction or alteration of records with the intent to impede or obstruct federal
investigations).
65. See Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and Sentence
Bargaining, 84 TEx. L. REV. 2023,2043-45 (2006). Compare FED. R. CRIm. P. 16, with FED. R.
CRIM. P. 26.
66. R. Enters., 498 U.S. at 301 (limiting quashing of grand jury subpoenas to situations in
which there is no reasonable possibility of uncovering relevant information).
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supporting the search warrant may be sealed by a district judge and remain under seal
while the government completes its investigation. 67 Discovery, which is significantly
more limited in criminal than in civil cases, will not be ordered until after the
prosecutor has obtained an indictment from the grand jury.68 Even then, the prosecutor
need not produce every page of her file; rather, she need only produce the defendant's
own statements and any evidence she intends to offer at trial. 69 As a result, in any
corporate prosecution, informational asymmetries will abound. In some instances, the
prosecutor may have a better sense of the company's (and its individual employees')
liability than the company's independent board members or general counsel.
Although the disclosure rules favor the prosecutor, her greatest source of power is
her unfettered charging discretion. Absent some showing of post-trial "vindictiveness"
or racially motivated behavior, the prosecutor's charging decision is sacrosanct. 70 No
court can overturn a prosecutor's decision not to prosecute someone. 7 1 Nor can any
court throw out an otherwise factually sufficient indictment simply because the court
disagrees with the prosecutor's exercise of discretion.72
The plea bargaining process, which includes deferred prosecution agreements
73
(DPAs)-is largely immune from judicial review. The federal prosecutor who pursues
a corporate defendant is subject neither to the administrative constraints of a regulator
67. Matter of Sealed Affidavits to Search Warrants Executed on February 14, 1977, 600
F.2d 1256, 1257 (9th Cir. 1979) ("courts have inherent power, as an incident of their
constitutional function, to control papers filed within the courts within constitutional and other
limitations"); United States v. Napier, 436 F.3d 1133,1139 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming lower
court's refusal to unseal portions of affidavit that related to confidential informant); Times
Mirror Co. v. U.S. District Court, 873 F.2d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir. 1999) (sealing of affidavit
appropriate to protect pre-indictment investigation). See also David Horan, Breaking the Seal on
White Collar Search Warrant Materials, 28 PEP. L. REv. 317, 324 (2001) (observing that sealing
of federal search warrants has become common).
68. See FED. R. CRIm. P. 16.
69. Id.
70. "In our system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused
committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what
charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion."
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (granting
Executive power to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed").
71. See generally Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (holding that private
individuals lack "judicially cognizable interest" in prosecution of another person).
72. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36,48 (1992) (holding that prosecutor not required
to seek court's approval for indictment).
73. DPAs fall within two broad categories. Some are drafted and entered into before the
prosecutor has filed any charges whatsoever. In those instances, the DPA is purely "private" and
the courts have no interest in these agreements ex ante. In a second group, the Government files
an information or complaint, but the parties agree that it will be deferred for the length of time
agreed upon in the DPA. A court then must sign off on the DPA insofar as it implicates the
Speedy Trial Act. Other than the Speedy Trial Act concern, however, the court does not review
the agreement's substance. See Wilson Meeks, Note, Corporate and White-Collar Crime
Enforcement: Should Regulation and Rehabilitation Spell an End to Corporate Criminal
Liability?, 40 COLtUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 77, 107 (2006).
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nor the litigation restraints of a civil attorney. Her word is final and her mistakes are
largely unknowable and uncorrectable.
74
B. The Prosecutor's Burden
Where prosecutions of individuals are concerned, the prosecutor's broad powers
might be justified as necessary to meet the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Prosecutors have often claimed that these powers are necessary because: (a)
violations within the corporate context are more complex and therefore more difficult
to detect and explain to a jury; (b) suspects are well-funded and have access to good
legal representation; and (c) the crimes are often committed by groups of people who
can use their collective powers (and their positions within the firm itself) to obstruct
the government's investigation and thwart legitimate law enforcement aims.
75
If the government is unable to identify the person or persons who are responsible
for wrongdoing, employees and managers will be undeterred from committing
corporate crimes. Potential investors, in turn, may question the integrity of public (and
private) markets and may either leave the market altogether or invest inefficiently in
their own protection. Accordingly, prosecutors argue, there is good reason for the
government to have broad power to demand information and access from corporate
firms. From this perspective, the corporate managers who complain about corporate
liability are not so worried about protecting the entity as they are with protecting their
own skin.76
Courts and legislatures, however, have alleviated the prosecutor's burden in white
collar prosecutions in number of ways.77 They have made it relatively easy for the
government to request and obtain information from corporate entities. 8 They have
expanded the prosecutor's reach by enacting a proliferating number of (often
overlapping) criminal statutes.7 9 They have increased sentences 80 for individual
74. For similar criticisms of the judiciary, see Richard A. Epstein, The Unintended
Revolution in Products Liability Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 2193, 2202-03 (1980) ("Today all
doctrinal innovation has to come from the courts, where the technical lags and information
deficits are at their highest. Yet there is no alternative forum, save legislation, in which to
override judgments when they have proved mistaken; indeed, there is no way to find out
whether they are mistaken at all.").
75. See Bharara, supra note 2, at 72 (citing the "widespread-and largely legitimate-view
that white collar crime is singularly difficult to detect, investigate, and prosecute"); Peter J.
Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White-Collar Crime: How Far
Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. Prrr. L. REv. 405 (1993) (analyzing current
trends in white collar cases that courts are struggling to resolve).
76. Cohen, supra note 19, at 146-47.
77. See generally HASNAS, supra note 18, at 23-55 (describing solutions to enforcement of
corporate criminal liability).
78. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
79. HASNAS, supra note 18, at 31-32.
80. See Frank 0. Bowman, Pour Encourager Les Autres? The Curious History and
Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Sentencing Guidelines Amendments that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373 (2004) (tracking
the increase of penalties for economic crime offenders under United States Sentencing
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offenses (including white collar crimes) and simultaneously have offered attractive
cooperation agreements for defendants who help the government, thereby increasing
the likelihood that some employee-defendants will turn on others. Finally, they have
enacted an incredibly broad liability standard for corporate entities. It is this last
"innovation" that is discussed in the next Section.
C. The Need for Composite Liability
The contemporary criminal liability standard for organizations is incredibly broad.8'
Business entities may be held criminally liable for any act by any employee acting
within the scope of his apparent authority provided the employee acted with at least a
partial intent of benefiting the corporation.8 2 The organization may be prosecuted for
an employee's conduct regardless of whether it violated corporate policy or specific
83instructions. Even where criminal conduct cannot be attributed to a single employee,
the corporation still may be prosecuted under a collective knowledge theory.
84
Under this broad enunciation of liability, hundreds of thousands of entities are
potentially eligible for prosecution every year. 85 Federal prosecutors, however, lack
both the physical and political resources to prosecute every guilty entity. Moreover,
prosecutions and convictions of organizations have far-reaching collateral effects.
Were the government to systematically indict each plausibly guilty organizational
defendant, the visible, harmful fall-out of these indictments might spur the public to
contract the liability standard or re-examine its consequences. Instead--either with an
intent to preserving resources or maintaining power-the federal criminal justice
system has adopted what is often referred to as a "composite" standard of liability.
Although the organization technically operates in a strict liability regime, prosecutors
(and, pursuant to the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, judges) may soften that
liability when the organization demonstrates sufficient compliance efforts prior to
detection, and cooperation efforts after detection.
Guidelines in 2001, and additional increases that occurred following passage of Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002); Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in
Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REv. 937, 954 (2003) (describing significant increases
in statutory maximum penalties for economic crimes pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley).
81. In a 2005 speech, Mary Jo White, a former United States Attorney of the Southern
District of New York, soberly warned an audience of defense attorneys:
[T]he sweep of corporate criminal liability could hardly be broader. All of you in
this audience probably know the law well, but its breathtaking scope always bears
repeating: If a single employee, however low down in the corporate hierarchy,
commits a crime in the course of his or her employment, even in part to benefit the
corporation, the corporate employer is criminally liable for that employee's crime.
It is essentially absolute liability.
Mary Jo White, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Has Gone Wrong?, 1517 PLI/CoRP 815
(2005).
82. See, e.g., United States v. Automated Med. Labs, 770 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1985).
83. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972).
84. See United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987).
85. See HASNAS, supra note 18, at 12 (federal criminal law statutes such as mail fraud
statute "authorize the punishment of almost any kind of dishonest or deceptive behavior, even
when no other party has suffered harm").
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Compliance and cooperation help the government and the organization, albeit in
different ways. For the organization, compliance and cooperation lessen the possibility
that the government will charge the organization at all and, if all else fails, reduce its
likely sentence under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG). At the same
time, the composite system provides the government with a method of screening
potential defendants, maintaining control over business entities, and leveraging its
prosecution of individuals. Moreover, because it leaves the specific details of internal
compliance largely to the private sector, the system creates an impression of flexibility
and private initiative.
86
Theoretically, society ought to prefer the composite system of liability to its two
logical alternatives, negligence and strict liability.
7
Under a negligence regime, organizations are criminally liable only if the
government proves that they failed to monitor employees adequately and prevent and
report their crimes. This definition of "due care" creates strong incentives for firms to
monitor their employees and credibly deters the firm's employees, who fear both
internal detection and external prosecution. 88 However, there may be some activities
that, regardless of an organization's due care, create substantial costs. Under a
negligence system, these costs are borne solely by the firm's victims. If victims are
unable to shift these costs back onto producers, then producers will engage in the same
level of activity without regard to the activity's true costs. Negligence fails to secure
optimal activity levels.89 Moreover, because a negligence regime requires a
determination of due care by a finder of fact, it is administratively expensive and prone
to error.90 Accordingly, strict liability is preferable when externalities are prevalent and
due care determinations are likely to be difficult.
Strict liability-which holds the organization strictly liable for all of its employees'
work-related torts and crimes-is preferable to negligence insofar as it forces firms to
set activity levels at optimal levels. It also avoids the error and cost problems that
plague negligence systems. On the other hand, as Professors Arlen and Kraakman
explain, strict liability perversely discourages firms from monitoring, detecting, and
reporting their employees' wrongdoing because firms receive no credit for monitoring
and reporting employee crime.91 To the contrary, monitoring increases the likelihood
86. "Legislative and regulatory responses to private sector crises using internal controls
enable the state to reach into the private sector to exert power, while preserving the essentially
private character of its organizations and their operation." Cunningham, supra note 56, at 281.
87. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 33, at 718. Arlen and Kraakman further distinguish
between "adjusted strict liability" regimes that hold firms strictly liable for their employees'
crimes, but insulate their monitoring results (through an evidentiary privilege, for example); and
"composite regimes," which hold firms liable for "all detected wrongs but impos[e] an
additional sanction on firms with suboptimal policing measures." Id. at 726. As used in this
Article, the term "composite liability" refers to this second category of mixed liability regimes.
88. Id. at715-16.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 707-09; see also Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994) (presenting an economic analysis of the
impact of strict liability on corporate expenditures on enforcement costs). Even under a strict
liability regime, some corporate managers will employ monitoring as a form of self-defense,
which in turn may disclose crimes that "help" the organization. For example, a CFO who is
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of liability for residual crimes that the company can only detect but not prevent. If the
combined costs of monitoring and increased liability for detection outweigh the
benefits of prevention, then rational firms will divert resources from monitoring or
instead erect "cosmetic" monitoring programs. 92 Moreover, since employees know that
their employer does not want to detect crime, employees in a strict liability regime do
not take their employers' monitoring threats seriously.
93
Under a composite liability rule, the entity is strictly liable for its employees'
wrongdoing, but may mitigate its sentence by demonstrating a defined level of care
(i.e. monitoring and reporting). The composite system is often deemed superior to a
pure strict liability system because it preserves the firm's incentives to monitor and
report wrongdoing, yet bypasses the administrative costs of the negligence system. In
this ideal world, firms self-monitor, detect, and report crime (for which they are
rewarded with lesser penalties), and yet they also strive to set activity levels at optimal
levels. 94
Unfortunately, the composite system's theoretical advantages are eclipsed by the
drawbacks of its real-world application. These drawbacks include: (1) the use of
vaguely worded performance standards in lieu of specific rules that lay out the terms of
mitigation; 95(2) a lack of transparency in the manner in which these performance
standards are applied to individual cases; and (3) the dearth of opportunities to
challenge the government's decision-making process. All of these drawbacks taken
together effectively distort much of the composite system's theoretical benefits.96
cooking the books might also be siphoning money from corporate accounts into his own bank
account. If organizations employ controls to deter the second type of conduct, they may
simultaneously detect the first type. See James D. Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of
Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 14-15 (1997). Self-defensive
monitoring, however, may be insufficient if the employee of the organization is effectively
insulated from the effects of the employee's criminal conduct (e.g., dumping toxic chemicals
into a river that is located far away). Nor does it ensure that corporations will report to
authorities the misconduct that they detect. Cf Richard A. Epstein, Imperfect Liability Regimes:
Individual and Corporate Issues, 53 S.C. L. REv. 1153, 1156-57 (2001) (in the context of
automobile accidents, observing that self-bonding is an incomplete deterrent when injurer can
insulate himself from harm).
92. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 33, at 707, and Arlen, supra note 91, at 836, for
discussions of diversion of resources. For "cosmetic compliance," see Vikramaditya S. Khanna,
Should the Behavior of Top Management Matter?, 91 GEO. L.J. 1215, 1231 (2003) (describing
"window dressing" measures); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003).
93. Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 33, at 714-15. If the probability of detection were
already very high, firms subject to strict liability might still adopt monitoring regimes since they
would not increase the probability of detection substantially. See Khanna, supra note 92, at
1232.
94. See Khanna, supra note 92, at 1268-69.
95. I am referring to the tri-partite discussion of regulation (command-and-control rules,
performance based standards, and incentives) set out by Susan Rose-Ackerman and amplified
by Jon Hanson and Kyle Logue. Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The
Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1173-74, 1264
(1998) (citing SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM
OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE (1992)).
96. "The most profound problem with [the composite regime] is the likely indeterminacy of
the undertaking to engage in 'optimal' compliance efforts. Such a finding will be made expost
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D. The DOJ's Execution of the Composite System
The Department of Justice's (DOJ's) nonbinding internal policies for prosecutors
lay out the standards of conduct that prosecutors must consider when they decide
whether an organization has earned mitigation under the composite system.97 Over the
last decade, these policies have been circulated in memoranda form by the presiding
Deputy Attorney General.98
1. The McNulty Memo: An Overview
The McNulty Memo, implemented by Paul McNulty on December 12,2006, is the
latest iteration of the DOJ's internal policy for charging business entities. 99 The
McNulty Memo came about in part because the ABA and numerous scholars and
practitioners had repeatedly criticized its predecessor policy, the Thompson Memo
(named for then Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson) for encouraging
prosecutors to consider the organization's willingness to waive its attorney-client
privilege in exchange for lenience. 10 Judge Kaplan's opinion in Stein I (which
addressed a related issue, the government's pressure on companies to deny attorneys
fees to indicted employees), followed by Senator Arlen Specter's threats to enact
legislation protecting the corporate attorney-client privilege, precipitated the DOJ's
revision of its internal charging policies. 101
and there likely will be little guidance ex ante as to what constitutes optimal compliance
efforts." Cox, supra note 91, at 16 (emphasis in original).
97. It is unclear how the DOJ would respond to instances in which prosecutors failed to
adhere to these policies, which expressly deny the creation of any substantive or procedural
rights for business entities. See, e.g., McNulty Memo, supra note 19, at 19. The Department of
Justice historically has exercised uneven levels of authority over the United States Attorneys'
offices. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and
Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REv. 757, 805 (1999) (discussing dispersed authority of
U.S. Attorneys' offices).
98. The SEC maintains a separate Framework for Cooperation by which its Enforcement
Division evaluates whether corporations should be fined or criminally prosecuted for their
employee's violations of the security laws. Like the DOJ's internal policies, the SEC's
framework urges its regulators to examine the organization's compliance program and its
subsequent cooperation with SEC staff. Criminal charging decisions, however, are ultimately
made by the prosecutors within the United States Attorneys' Offices and the Department of
Justice. The relationship between federal prosecutors and regulators and the costs and benefits
of parallel civil and criminal litigation is beyond the scope of this Article.
99. See McNulty Memo, supra note 19.
100. E.g., ABA Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege, Report of the American Bar
Association's Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 60 Bus. LAW. 1029, 1043-46
(2005); Earl J. Silbert & Demme Doufekias Joannou, Under Pressure to Catch the Crooks: The
Impact of Corporate Privilege Waiver on the Adversarial System, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1225,
1238 (2006).
101. On September 13, 2006, Paul McNulty, then Deputy Attorney General, announced
during testimony before the Judiciary Committee (then headed by Specter) that the Department
of Justice was reviewing its internal charging memorandum in light of the criticism of the
KPMG case. See Lynnley Browning, Justice Department is Reviewing Corporate Prosecution
Guidelines, N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 13, 2006, at C3.
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Breaking from its predecessor policies, the McNulty Memo arguably protects
attorney-client privileged documents by requiring prosecutors to seek advance DOJ
approval and follow certain procedures prior to seeking a corporate waiver.'02 Apart
from the new waiver procedure and a provision advising that organizations ordinarily
will not be penalized for paying attorneys fees for employees who have been targeted
by the prosecution,' 0 3 the McNulty Memo's substantive provisions are nearly identical
to the Thompson Memo, which was released to the public on January 20, 2003, and
governed prosecutorial charging decisions from that date through December 10,
2006.'04 Both the McNulty and Thompson Memos affirmatively require' 05 prosecutors
to assess entity-based charges in "any matter" of business crime and to include an
analysis of each of nine factors. 106
102. McNulty Memo, supra note 19, at 8. In order to obtain such approval, the individual
prosecutor must demonstrate a "legitimate need" for such documents, which in turn depends on:
(a) the likelihood the privileged information will assist the government's investigation; (b)
whether alternate means of obtaining the information exist; (c) the completeness of the
organization's voluntary disclosure; and (d) the collateral consequences of waiver to the
corporation. Id. at 9.
103. "Prosecutors generally should not take into account whether a corporation is advancing
attorneys' fees to employees or agents under investigation and indictment." Id. at 11. A footnote
suggests, however, that such payments may be taken into account if it appears that the
corporation is behaving in such a manner as to obstruct the investigation. Id. at 11 n.3. It is
unclear what the DOJ means by this footnote since any payment of fees is "obstructive" insofar
as it assists a target in leveraging his defense.
104. The first DOJ memo to set forth the government's position on charging corporations for
their employees' crimes was released by Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder in 1999. The
Holder Memo, which originally was not released to the public, was intended only as a summary
of "best" practices that different United States Attorneys' Offices had adopted, partly in
response to the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, which also employed a similar "carrot
and stick" approach. Finder & McConnell, supra note 14, at 3, 6-9.
105. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to United States
Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/businessorganizations.pdf [hereinafter Thompson
Memo]; McNulty Memo, supra note 19, at 2; see also Christopher J. Christie & Robert M.
Hanna, A Push Down the Road of Good Corporate Citizenship: The Deferred Prosecution
Agreement Between the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey and Bristol-Meyers Squibb
Co., 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1043, 1045 (2006) (noting that the Thompson Memo's "analytical
framework applies in all corporate fraud investigations").
106. McNulty Memo, supra note 19, at 4; Thompson Memo, supra note 105, at 3-4. Those
nine factors are: (1) the nature and seriousness of the offense; (2) the "pervasiveness of
wrongdoing within the organization; (3) the organization's history of similar conduct; (4) the
organization's "timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate
in the investigation of its agents" including willingness to waive the attorney-client privilege;
(5) the "existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance program"; (6) remedial actions,
including any efforts to implement an "effective" corporate compliance program or to improve
an existing one or to replace, discipline, or terminate "wrongdoers"; (7) collateral consequences
and impact on the public arising from the prosecution; (8) the adequacy of the prosecution of
individuals responsible for the corporation's malfeasance; and (9) the adequacy of civil or
regulatory enforcement actions. Id.
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Both Memos rest on the assumption that entity-based prosecutions improve
corporate business. Without attempting to separate out entity-based prosecutions from
prosecutions of individual defendants, the McNulty Memo lauds prosecutors for their
"unprecedented success in prosecuting corporate fraud" during the preceding four
years. As a result of these prosecutions, "the information used by our nation's financial
markets is more reliable, our retirement plans are more secure, and the investing public
is better protected as a result of our efforts."
1
'
0 7
The McNulty Memo does not consider whether the alleged increase in the reliability
of markets and pension plans is traceable solely to entity-based prosecutions, or
whether such increase in liability stems from structural improvements brought about by
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,108 the government's increased prosecution of
individual criminals, and the public's and media's increased attention to the veracity of
financial reporting. Moreover, the Memo fails to consider the point at which social
costs of corporate "self-regulation" outweigh the benefits of fraud reduction. Instead,
the Memo implies that any reduction in fraud redounds to the benefit of shareholders.
2. McNulty, Morality, and the Nature of the Firm
Like its predecessor, the McNulty Memo defends corporate criminal liability as a
means "to address and be a force for positive change of corporate culture [and] alter
corporate behavior."'°9 This statement is important because it belies a presumption that
corporate entities are singular moral actors and therefore amenable to blame and
punishment. This presumption, however, is hardly a foregone notion.
Although some scholars have proposed (and the McNulty Memo presumes) that an
identifiable "corporate ethos" or culture causes individual criminal conduct and
therefore subjects the corporate entity to moral condemnation and criminal liability, 110
nowhere else in criminal law does such a broad theory of vicarious liability exist. "'
Moreover, the culture-based argument for entity liability ignores the modem
understanding of the corporation as an organizational form that brings together a mass
of uninformed and fairly weak owners (shareholders) who must depend in large part on
directors to monitor the strong executives who run the firm."2
107. McNulty Memo, supra note 19, at 1.
108. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
109. McNulty Memo, supra note 19, at 2; Thompson Memo, supra note 105, at 1.
110. E.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standardfor Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (1991); Buell, supra note 39.
111. According to Professor Brown:
Criminal law has well established ways to address conduct that wrongly compels
others to commit crimes-for example, liability for coercion and duress
defenses-or wrongly encourages or aids others in crime commission-for
example, complicity and accomplice liability. And when another's influence on an
actor's conduct falls short of complicity... no liability follows, even though it
may be a real influence.
Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime and the Contingency of Criminal Liability,
149 U. PA. L. REv. 1295, 1318 (2001).
112. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932).
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To the extent that one subscribes to the view that a public corporation is a form of
ownership that permits a diffuse group of investors (shareholders) to efficiently do
business with a much smaller, coordinated group of professionals (managers), with the
oversight of agents (directors), corporate crime is not a separate moral wrong, but
rather yet another agency cost that investors must figure out how to control. 3 These
costs are further complicated by the complex organization into which the modem
corporation has evolved. " 4 Corporate criminal liability, under this view, is not only
inefficient, but it is also highly unfair: it effectively punishes shareholders for the very
agency costs they already were attempting to reduce and control. "5
3. McNulty and Compliance
In addition to treating the corporation as a moral actor, the Memo also lauds the
prosecutor's opportunity to create "deterrence on a massive scale" by indicting one
corporate actor in an industry suffering "pervasive" criminal conduct, as well as the
113. Agency costs are the costs that arise when managers' interests diverge from those of the
principals (shareholders) on whose behalf they act. See Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3
J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Agency costs have often been described as "one of the central
problems organizing the field of corporate law." Steven P. Croley, Vicarious Liability in Tort:
On the Sources andLimits of Employee Reasonableness, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1705, 1715 (1996).
114. As explained by Dean Oakes:
The truth is that organizational failure is caused by more than a failure in
coordination, planning or information processing. There are micro-economic
rewards and punishments within the organization and varying levels of leadership
and employee motivation. The corporate setting is even more complicated by
concepts and practices such as team production, work groups, independent
departmental profit and loss calculations, etc.
Richard T. Oakes, Anthropomorphic Projection and Chapter Eight of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Punishing the Good Organization When It Does Evil, 22 HAmLINEL. REv. 749, 759
(1999); see also Croley, supra note 113, at 1706 ("[Rleal firms are not monolithic actors...
[rather,] they are networks of many semi-autonomous actors whose behavior is related in many
complicated and contingent ways.").
115. For a similar criticism of enterprise liability for fraud on the market, see Jennifer H.
Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Security Markets: Theory and
Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 691, 693 (1992):
[S]hareholders face collective action problems because they are too numerous to
manage the firm .... They therefore hire agents (directors) to manage it for them.
These directors, not the firm's owners, decide how the firm will deter wrongful
acts by its agents .... [But] [t]hese directors may not impose optimal sanctions on
the firm's agents. This possibility introduces an additional level of agency costs
[and] ... is particularly important in Fraud on the Market cases, because Fraud on
the Market is generally committed by some of the very directors and senior
officers hired to manage the firm and to deter fraud.
Id. (citation omitted); see also John C. Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay
on Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1534, 1537 (2006) ("To punish the
corporation and its shareholders in such a case is much like seeking to deter burglary by
imposing penalties on the victim for having suffered a burglary.").
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opportunity to create "specific deterrence" by altering the indicted entity's culture. 16
Absent from the Memo is any analysis of why prosecutors are the proper actors (even
among government actors) for improving corporate governance within firms and why
criminal law is the appropriate vehicle for altering corporate behavior. 1
7
Although the McNulty Memo dispenses with some of the Thompson Memo's
emphasis on detecting "false cooperation" by corporate defendants, it has retained the
essential nine-factor framework through which prosecutors decide how to treat
potential corporate defendants. Despite the presence of nine factors, most government
charging decisions boil down to two key questions: the steps the organization took to
prevent the given situation (i.e., the organization's compliance program) and the steps
the organization took to rectify the situation through cooperation and other
"assistance." 118
Neither the McNulty nor Thompson Memos provide formal guidelines for assessing
compliance programs. Instead, both Memos proclaim:
The fundamental questions any prosecutor should ask are: "Is the corporation's
compliance program well designed?" and "Does the corporation's compliance
program work?""19
In case prosecutors are unsure how to decide if a program is "well-designed" or
whether it "works," the Memo offers further guidance:
In answering these questions, the prosecutor should consider the
comprehensiveness of the compliance program; the extent and pervasiveness of
the criminal conduct; the number and level of the corporate employees involved;
the serious duration and frequency of the misconduct; and any remedial actions
116. McNulty Memo, supra note 19, at 2. This deterrence argument nevertheless rests in part
on a belief that government can improve the moral fiber of individuals who run corporate firms.
SEC officials, for example, have claimed an obligation to improve the "moral DNA" of
corporate executives. See Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law
Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REv. 757, 773 (2005) (quoting then-SEC Chairman William
Donaldson's 2004 speech to the Practicing Law Institute).
117. Indeed, the DOJ's attempt to define good corporate governance is in stark contrast to
the business judgment rule, which ordinarily leaves the internal affairs of the corporation to its
board of directors. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2007); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858 (Del. 1985). The corollary to this rule is that shareholders are best served when board
members are not unduly risk averse (i.e., when they are free to make decisions that later on turn
out to be wrong). See, e.g., Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
118. "In many of the cases we have seen in the past couple of years, two of the most
important factors we've focused on are the corporation's culture, and the authenticity of the
company's cooperation. Those two factors are, in some sense, two sides of the same coin."
Christopher Wray, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice,
Remarks at the 22nd Annual Corporate Counsel Institute (Dec. 12, 2003) 5, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminallpr/speeches/2003/12/2003 2986_rmrkl2l203Corprtconslinst.
pdf.
119. McNulty Memo, supra note 19, at 14; Thompson Memo, supra note 105, at 7.
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taken by the corporation, including restitution, disciplinary action, and revisions to
corporate compliance programs. 12
This inquiry suffers on a number of levels. First, it is difficult to perceive how a
prosecutor, even one who has some expertise in corporate governance, will decide
whether a program is "well-designed" or whether it "works" without expending
considerable time and resources examining the organization, its industrial context and
the relative benefits and drawbacks of numerous compliance-related decisions. 12 Even
if government prosecutors were inclined and properly situated to undertake this task,
they might well come up with the wrong answer.' 
22
Moreover, the DOJ's policy presumes that "effective" compliance programs reduce
crime. However, deterrence theory strongly suggests that "effective" programs-for
example, those designed and funded in such a manner as to deter crime-may create
perverse outcomes as a result of substitution effects.
123
For example, imagine that a well-funded compliance program enacted in good faith
deters or apprehends seventy-five percent of the employees who otherwise would have
violated the law. The remaining twenty-five percent, however, respond to the
compliance program either by continuing their crimes or by investing resources in
detection avoidance and committing crimes that are less easily detected but more
serious (and therefore whose projected payoff exceeds the projected sanction if
caught).12 4 As Professor Katyal observed in his 1997 article on deterrence, when
sanctions are implemented, the criminal's choice is not as simple as "crime" or "no
crime." 125 Instead, the criminal may substitute his activity with other criminal conduct,
or he may supplement the same criminal conduct with measures designed to reduce the
probability of detection. 1
26
Corporate criminals may be particularly likely to choose detection avoidance over
cessation of crime when corporations adopt or enhance compliance programs after
crimes have already been committed or are already under way. (This obviously would
be the case for any company that attempts to increase compliance efforts after it has
already become a going concern). For example, imagine an employee who has already
120. McNulty Memo, supra note 19, at 14; Thompson Memo, supra note 105, at 7.
121. In contrast, the Delaware Chancery Court's decision in In re Caremark International,
Inc., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), which both Memos cite, simply held that directors should
ensure that some method of measuring compliance or internal controls existed within the firm.
In fact, the Caremark court stressed that "the level of detail that is appropriate for [a legal
compliance] system is a question of business judgment" and that, at least as Delaware law was
concerned, board members should not be held civilly liable for trusting their employees "absent
grounds to suspect deception." Id. at 970. Many of the compliance programs that are the source
of federal scrutiny would meet the standard laid out by Chancellor Allen in Caremark.
122. See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CoRP. L. 887,908 ("A review
of recent finance literature suggests that a number of the governance metrics selected [by rating
agencies] do not reliably predict firm performance.").
123. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2385,
2387 (1997); Chris W. Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1331, 1352-60
(2006) (discussing detection avoidance costs).
124. See Sanchirico, supra note 123, at 1368-69.
125. See Katyal, supra note 123, at 2387.
126. Id. at 2387; Sanchirico, supra note 123, at 1337.
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committed, or is in the midst of committing, a crime, such as creating a fraudulent
financial statement for a company's first quarter disclosure. If, after the first fraudulent
statement, the company visibly enlarges its compliance program (and therefore
increases the probability of the employee's apprehension), his consideration of whether
to file a fraudulent second quarter statement will depend not only on the benefit he can
achieve with the new crime (which is reduced by the increased probability of
detection), but also the benefit he gets from covering up the prior crime. In other
words, the second fraudulent statement not only increases his yearlong bonus, but it
also covers up the prior fraudulent statement and permits him to avoid the sanction that
would surely accrue if he put out a truthful second statement and triggered an
investigation into the discrepancy between the first and second quarter statements.'
27
Accordingly, because of the periodic, ongoing nature of crime (which one could
argue is particularly the case with fraud and financial crimes), compliance programs
may encourage avoidance detection expenditures. These expenditures, in turn, may
result not only in the commission of additional crimes (both to cover up the original
crime, and perhaps to compensate for the resources expended on detection avoidance),
but also the commission of more serious crimes. For example, if the employee is
unable to discern how much his avoidance measures have lowered the probability of
detection, he might compensate by increasing the magnitude of his future crime.
Finally, as Katyal notes in the street crime context, while the compliance program
drives the more risk averse criminals out of the market, the criminals who remain can
exercise monopoly power over the remaining goods. 1
28
In sum, a "good" compliance program (as opposed to one that is merely cosmetic in
character) may encourage the worst employee-criminals to expend greater corporate
resources covering up the worst crimes. 129 To counteract this phenomenon (assuming
the company is even aware of it), the company either must: (a) increase its detection
efforts even more, or (b) increase its sanctions.
127. Imagine at a given time T, a crime produces a Benefit, B, of 10, with a 1% Probability
of Detection, p, and Sanction, s, of 100. Under such conditions, B is greater than the expected
value of the penalty (p multiplied by s) and the rational criminal will commit the crime. If,
sometime during or following the commission of the crime, at TI, Company X increases its
enforcement efforts such that expected penalty increases to 20 (either by increasing sanctions or
probability of detection), then the costs of the conduct outweigh the benefits since 20 obviously
exceeds 10.
Criminals who have not yet committed the crime will be deterred. Criminals who have
committed prior crimes and who are committed to engaging in future crimes in order to cover
up the initial crimes (such as fraudulent financial reports for public companies) are much less
likely to be deterred, however, because the benefit now includes the foregone sanction from the
prior crime assuming cessation of criminal conduct increases the probability of detection to
100%. Or,
10 + 100 [the benefit plus the foregone sanction] > 20 [the expected value of the
new penalty]
For a more in depth discussion of this timing problem, see Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the
Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 VA. L. REv. (2008) (forthcoming).
128. Katyal, supra note 123, at 2415.
129. id. at 2414 (pointing out that equal detection rates may bring down the overall crime
rate but encourage the proliferation of "particularly heinous" crimes).
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Option A (increase probability of detection) is effectively capped by law.
Companies might place video monitors in every office and read every employee's
work email, which of course has its own drawbacks. Companies cannot, however,
wiretap employees' personal phones, search their homes, or subpoena their personal
bank accounts. Would-be criminals who know they are being watched will simply
conduct their activities beyond the scope of the company's legal eyes and ears.
Option B (increase sanctions) also has inherent limitations. In most instances, the
worst sanction a company can level on an employee is termination. Unfortunately, the
DOJ's emphasis on "corporate culture" undermines Option B's usefulness. Swift
termination of even slightly wayward employees is the company's way of
demonstrating that it does not tolerate crime. This option, however, may eliminate
marginal deterrence. 130 If stealing a pencil from the supply closet is sufficient to get
fired, then the employee might as well steal the contents of the petty cash drawer
too.' 31 It may also undermine more subtle attempts at communitarian control. Instead
of giving wayward employees a chance to reform, the company will feel compelled to
terminate them the minute any wrongdoing, however minor, is detected.
My point is not that compliance is hopeless, but that compliance programs, even
those instituted in "good faith," may very well fail in their efforts to prevent
wrongdoing. Some employee-criminals will react to increased detection and sanctions
by expending private and corporate resources on detection avoidance or on other
criminal conduct. 1
32
This is not the only problem with the McNulty Memo. The prosecutor's role as
arbiter of compliance is equally problematic. Cognitive biases and heuristics, such as
hindsight bias and accessibility, may also affect the prosecutor's decision.' 33 In other
words, the government will be more likely to conclude that criminal conduct was
foreseeable to the organization because it in fact occurred. And prosecutors, who
regularly come into contact with defendants who lie and cheat, will more likely
130. See Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a
Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1232, 1245-46 (1985) (explaining that uniformly high sanctions
eliminate marginal deterrence for varying crimes).
131. See Katyal, supra note 123, at 2414-15 (discussing problems when range of sanctions
is limited).
132. "Cleave another violation with a sanction and you discourage it. Cleave detection
avoidance, and like the hydra, it grows another head." Sanchirico, supra note 123, at 1367.
133. See generally Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 38-39 (Cass R.
Sunstein ed., 2000) (discussing hindsight bias in the context of negligence determinations by
juries). These biases and heuristics apply informatively to prosecutors. See Alafair S. Burke,
Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1587, 1590-91 (2006); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 291 (2006) (discussing
hindsight bias as it applies to criminal prosecutions); Rachel E. Barkow & Kathleen M. O'Neill,
Delegating Punitive Power: The Political Economy of Sentencing Commission and Guideline
Formation, 84 TEx. L. REV. 1973, 1981-82 & n.35 (2006); Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to
Do With It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the
Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BuFF. CRIm. L. REv. 23 (1997) (discussing
accessibility).
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criticize those companies that accepted their employees' non-criminal explanations too
easily.
4. McNulty and Cooperation
In addition to judging the organization's compliance efforts, prosecutors must also
assess the organization's cooperative efforts during the course of an investigation. 134
Presumably, cooperation is a relevant factor because it helps the government
distinguish "good" corporate citizens from "bad" ones. If the corporation did not intend
for the crime to occur, then the firm theoretically should be more than willing to extend
its "full cooperation" to the government.
Nevertheless, the cooperation-based inquiry substantially undermines the deterrence
goals of corporate criminal liability. Because the cooperation factor is aggregated with
all other factors under the McNulty analysis, the factor obscures the government's
compliance determination. A company could employ a state-of-the-art compliance
program (or agree to enact such a program), but if it fails to "cooperate" with the
government's investigation, it still may be indicted.
The aggregation problem is of particular importance because prosecutors have
institutional reasons for overemphasizing the cooperation prong at the expense of all
other factors. Contrary to the government's claims, the prosecutor is not some
objective arbiter, measuring the corporation's post-detection conduct against some
defined amount of "help." Instead, the prosecutor is a hired gun who will invariably
ask whether the entity has provided the government everything it needs to identify and
prosecute high-level employees. As the McNulty Memo implicitly recognizes, the
more pressure the prosecutor places on the organization, the more assistance he or she
will obtain from the organization in identifying additional criminal acts by corporate
employees. Additional evidence leads to additional indictments. If the corporation
cooperates, individual targets are easily isolated and less likely to have the resources to
fight. Isolated targets plead guilty more quickly and accept longer sentences and larger
fines. 135
Given these interests, as well as the individual United States Attorneys' Office's
institutional interest in competing for the public's good will and limited resources, 1
36
even the most principled prosecutor will have difficulty-as he wades through muddy
134. McNulty Memo, supra note 19, at 7-12; Thompson Memo, supra note 105, at 5-6.
135. Cf William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MicH. L. REv.
505,535-37 (2001) (describing local prosecutors' incentives to preserve resources through plea
bargaining procedures).
136. See generally Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution
Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 893,932-33 (2000)
("[I]t is at least the perception in United States Attorney's Offices that those offices that bring
increasing numbers of prosecutions will be 'rewarded' with increasing allocations of resources
(i.e., more positions for prosecutors, investigators, and support staff) and that those offices that
bring decreasing numbers of prosecutions will be 'penalized' by the Department of Justice
through corresponding reductions in resources."). Simons concludes that this perception leads
prosecutors to prosecute crimes that could otherwise be prosecuted in state courts. Id. at 933.
The perception, however, just as easily supports the hypothesis that prosecutors will extract
maximum convictions and maximum terms from corporate defendants.
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facts and complex considerations- separating his personal and bureaucratic interests
in maximizing individual convictions from his independent obligation to sort "good"
corporate citizens from "bad" ones. 1
37
Some might argue, as Professor Richman has, that prosecutorial excess can and will
be reigned in by the law enforcement agents (such as employees of the FBI, IRS, or
SEC) with whom prosecutors partner to investigate and prosecute cases. 138 Law
enforcement agents, however, do not have final say on whether the company will be
indicted or the specific terms of a firm's DPA. Moreover, law enforcement agents,
many of whom come from the enforcement division of a given agency, are also likely
to harbor many of the same cognitive biases as their counterparts within the United
States Attorneys' Offices.
5. Opacity and Uncertainty
Even if one were to assume that government prosecutors can efficiently discern
"good" corporate defendants from "bad" ones, the DOJ's internal policy fails to
provide either transparency or consistency.' 39 Because the McNulty and Thompson
Memos' factors are broad and subjective, it is costly and difficult for companies to
predict how they will be applied.' 4° The DOJ's internal guidelines do not require
prosecutors to publicly explain in writing the process by which they made factual
findings, or to quantify individual factors expost (much less in advance). As a result,
companies face uncertainty when they try to decide whether a given compliance
product will later be viewed as excessive or necessary by a prosecutor. Uncertainty, in
turn, can breed overdeterrence and risk aversion, both of which increase the company's
(and society's) costs. 141
137. Additionally, prosecutors may be unduly influenced by personal interests such as self
promotion or ego. See generally Kenneth Bresler, "I Never Lost a Trial: " When Prosecutors
Keep Score of Criminal Convictions, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 537, 541 (1996) (criticizing
prosecutors who maintain win-loss tallies).
138. Daniel Richman, Institutional Competence and Organizational Prosecutions, 93 VA. L.
REV. IN BRIEF 115, 116 (2007), httpl/:www.virginialawreview.orginbrief/20070618/
richman.pdf ("[Pirosecutors rarely act alone, and are unlikely to do so in a sustained white
collar investigation.").
139. Plea bargaining in general reduces transparency in the enforcement of criminal law,
with negative effects on public legitimacy. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and
Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911 (2006).
140. "If the legal standard is uncertain, even actors who behave 'optimally' in terms of
overall social welfare will face some chance of being held liable because of the unpredictability
of the legal rule. More important, these actors can usually reduce that chance by
'overcomplying,' that is, modifying their behavior beyond the point that would be socially
optimal." John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with
Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 966 (1984).
141. This is a common problem that can render standards (which are defined expost) more
costly than rules (which are defined ex ante) for regulated entities. See Ehud Kamar, A
Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy In Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908,
1919 (1998) (concluding that indeterminate laws increase costs of obtaining legal advice and
risk of litigation); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J.
557, 569 (1992).
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One might reasonably ask why well-funded organizations with access to excellent
representation do not take their chances more often by going to trial or by refusing
non-binding government requests that they view as excessive or inefficient. The far-
reaching collateral consequences of indictment, however, further explain why
overdeterrence and risk aversion are the likely outcomes of vague and inconsistently
applied standards.
Whereas individual defendants can tame overreaching prosecutors by taking their
case to trial (or, in the civil context, by testing regulatory decisions before
administrative judges and federal judges), corporate prosecutions offer far fewer
opportunities to test prosecutorial decision-making. 142 The DOJ's internal policies are
non-binding and not subject to legal review. Negotiations as to how those standards
apply occur outside the judicial system before any charges have been filed.14 3
Prosecutors need not justify their decisions to courts until after they have indicted
entities and individuals.
As has been noted by many others, however, corporate indictments often trigger
collateral consequences that threaten many entities' viability.144 Federal law, for
example, requires all federal agencies to debar or suspend any contract with any
indicted contractor or its affiliate, regardless of whether the indictment is in any way
related to the agency's contract.1 4 5 Similarly, indicted organizations may become
ineligible to receive federal aid. 146 Apart from debarment, a corporate indictment may
also result in the corporation's loss of licenses, permits, or ability to participate in
entire areas of regulated commerce, including accounting, banking, health care, law,
and other industries. 147 Corporate indictments also trigger reputation losses, including
downturns in the stock market, a reduction in potential employees and customers, and
the exodus of current customers and employees. 48 These effects often are
142. An exception to this rule is the government's prosecution of KPMG, which resulted in a
DPA and the government's indictment of former KPMG employees. Jonathan D. Glater, 8
Former Partners of KPMG Are Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30,2005, at C 1. It should be noted,
however, that the entity itself did not challenge the government's behavior in court; rather, the
individual defendants who were the subject of the government's prosecution brought the
government's conduct to the attention of the court.
143. Because these negotiations occur before charges are filed and outside the judicial
system, they too lack transparency and, in many instances, accountability for the negotiating
parties. See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REv. 911, 938 (2006).
144. See generally Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 40, at 1749-51 (discussing collateral
consequences in terms of "market spillovers"); Creamer, supra note 54, at 35-37 (describing
effects).
145. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-2, -5(a) (2006). For a more
in-depth discussion of debarment, see H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director's Compliance
Oversight Responsibility in the Post-Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CoRp. L. 1, 93-102 (2001).
146. Creamer, supra note 54, at 35.
147. See Greenblum, supra note 41, at 1885-86 (cataloguing consequences of criminal
convictions).
148. For a recent empirical study of losses suffered by managers upon the disclosure of
corporate financial misconduct, see Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The
Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation (April 16, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract --972607 at 30-34 (describing combination of job losses and civil and
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irreversible. 149 Although the Supreme Court eventually reversed and remanded Arthur
Andersen LLP's conviction for faulty jury instructions, Andersen remained effectively
defunct. 5 0
In sum, the combination of vague standards, applied by a branch of government that
is subject to little oversight and not likely to be held accountable for mistakes in
application, backed up by a legal system whose mere initiation creates a drastic and
often irreversible sanction, leads organizations to overpay for the crimes that their
employees have committed and for the crimes that their employees may one day
commit. 5 '
E. When and Where Organizations Overpay
The government's aggressive enforcement of a broad criminal liability standard,
combined with the significant extralegal consequences that accompany a criminal
indictment, creates an atmosphere wherein all organizations-not just the relative few
who come under the government's charging power-are likely to "overpay" for actual
and potential employee crimes. That is, they pay in excess of the penalties that
ordinarily would be necessary to deter criminal conduct, make victims whole, and
internalize the social costs of their employees' misconduct. 152 A penalty in excess of
that necessary to encourage optimal behavior is undesirable because it forces
organizations to misallocate resources and underproduce otherwise socially beneficial
goods.
Some will no doubt demand empirical evidence of overpayment. Because
"overpayment" includes both reduced risk-taking and overinvestment in ineffective
compliance, it is difficult to quantify the total amount by which corporate organizations
criminal penalties). Reputation losses are also discussed at length in Cindy R. Alexander, On the
Nature of the Reputational Penaltyfor Corporate Crime: Evidence, 42 J.L. & ECON. 489 (1999);
Mark A. Cohen, Corporate Crime and Punishment: An Update on Sentencing Practice in the
Federal Courts, 1988-1990,71 B.U. L. REv. 247,266-67 (1991); Jonathan M. Karpoff & John
R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. &
ECON. 757 (1993); Dennis Recca, Note, Reputational Penalties For Corporations and the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 2004 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 879.
149. "'[A] wrongful indictment ... works a grievous, irreparable injury to the person
indicted' resulting in damage to the person's reputation which, because the public remembers
the accusation and suspects guilt, can not be simply cured by a subsequent finding of not
guilty." Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 2d 553, 560 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 2005)
(quoting In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453,458-59 (2d Cir. 1947)), rev'd, 442 F.3d 177 (3rd Cir. 2006).
150. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005). The government declined
to retry Andersen.
151. Although the following comments on overdeterrence were not made in regard to
corporate criminal liability, they are nevertheless particularly apt: "If there is a risk either of
accidental violation of the criminal law or of legal error, an expected penalty will induce
innocent people to forgo socially desirable activities at the borderline of criminal activity. The
effect is magnified if people are risk averse and penalties are severe." Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1193, 1206 (1985).
152. It is also possible that some organizations underpay for corporate crime by creating
cosmetic compliance programs and/or designating certain employees as corporate scapegoats
for criminal conduct that was sanctioned more broadly. Because the facts supporting these
agreements (and indeed, many of the agreements themselves) are not public, it is difficult to test
these theories. Nevertheless, recent reports regarding the negotiation of agreements with KPMG
and Bristol Myers Squibb suggest an overpayment rather than an underpayment scenario.
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overpay for criminal liability. 153 Nevertheless, the sections below discuss potential and
actual instances of overpayment both before and after a corporation becomes the
subject of a criminal investigation.
1. Prior to Detection: "Regulation by Prosecution"
Prior to detection, organizations are likely to adopt monitoring and compliance
programs that please law enforcement actors but either are ineffective or overly deter
risky decisions. 1
5 4
The DOJ purposely has not prescribed the content of a corporate compliance
program. 155 DOJ officials contend that by leaving content undefined, the government
has created a flexible environment for private organizations to determine which
compliance tools work best for them. 156 This open-ended form of regulation, however,
is illusory. '57 Although the DOJ would have us believe that it has promulgated flexible
standards, the flexibility lies solely on the side of prosecutors. Since the McNulty
Memo declines to define "effective compliance" or "sufficient cooperation" ex ante,
the only safe standard is 100 percent compliance. Anything less may result in criminal
153. See Gilbert Geis & Joseph F.C. DiMento, Empirical Evidence and the Legal Doctrine
of Corporate Criminal Liability, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 341 (2002) (observing dearth of proof of
corporate criminal liability's effectiveness and suggesting topics for further empirical inquiry).
154. Professor Krawiec has questioned whether compliance programs are effective at all.
Krawiec, supra note 34, at 591-596. Krawiec hypothesizes that compliance programs remain
popular because of political influence exerted by the business lobby and compliance
professionals. Id. at 610-12. Krawiec further develops her public choice theory in another
recent article. Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U.
L.Q. 487 (2003) (concluding that business professionals would rather pay for "cosmetic"
compliance programs than affect real organizational change).
155. See McNulty Memo, supra note 19, at 14. Some agencies have filled in this gap. See,
e.g., OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, Department of
Health and Human Services, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,731 (May 5, 2003).
156. The McNulty and Thompson Memos include both rules and standards as those terms
have been defined by Louis Kaplow. Because key terms such as "effective compliance
program" and "sufficient cooperation" are only partially defined ex ante, they are best viewed
as "standards." See Kaplow, supra note 141, at 559-60 & n.2. Kaplow theorizes that when
activity is infrequent or affects few individuals, standards are preferable to rules because the
promulgation costs of defining a rule ex ante are high. Id. at 573. By contrast, "the greater the
frequency with which a legal command will apply, the more desirable rules tend to be relative to
standards. This result arises because promulgation costs are borne only once, whereas efforts to
comply with and action to enforce the law may occur rarely or often. Rules cost more to
promulgate; standards cost more to enforce." Id. at 577.
Corporate crime and entity-based liability questions are neither infrequent nor so
heterogeneous to render ex ante rules infeasible. Moreover, if one considers corporate criminal
liability to affect all shareholders and stakeholders (employees, customers, etc.), corporate
criminal liability affects potentially millions of people. Given the foregoing, we should expect
the government to promulgate rules instead of standards. Kaplow nevertheless concedes the
possibility that political motivations may cause a governing authority to prefer standards even
though rules appear more efficient. Id. at 609.
157. Cunningham, supra note 56, at 286 n.74 (suggesting that regulation in this context may
in fact be involuntary).
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liability. If the SEC or some other rule-making agency promulgated a formal rule that
expressly required firms to achieve 100 percent compliance, that rule would be met by
substantial public (and perhaps judicial) resistance. Instead, by purposely leaving the
definition blank in a nonbinding document, the DOJ has cheaply created a functional
equivalent of that standard.
By providing a vague standard of compliance and severely punishing corporations
that fail that illusive standard, the DOJ stifles experimentation and differentiation.
Instead, corporate entities are far more likely to adopt programs that have been
publicly designated "best practice" by regulators, prosecutors, or various members of
the growing compliance industry. 158 As Professor David Zaring has observed,
however, best practice regimes do not always result in best practices, but rather, the
same practices. 159
Prosecutors, in turn, are not only aware of this herd mentality, but welcome it:
"[G]overnance . . . enforced through a multi-year deferred prosecution or non-
prosecution agreement can become new standards for an entire industry-a kind of
regulation byprosecution." 16 (emphasis added). In other words, it is the government's
intent that non-regulated entities review publicly announced DPAs and then enact
some or all of the reforms present in the agreement.
Unfortunately, "regulation by prosecution" invokes more questions than answers.
Unlike regulations that are promulgated by agencies subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act and subject to extensive judicial review, regulations by prosecution are
subject to none of the checks and balances that ordinarily accompany agency
regulations, such as expert analysis, notice and comment periods, and political
accountability for final rules. 161 In sum, there is no mechanism that assures
accountability for the informal regulation that is wrought by an individual
158. See Laufer, supra note 18, at 1343 (describing "elaborate cottage industry" of experts
who "lay claim to dramatically reducing the likelihood of criminal liability"); Rose, supra note
122, at 925-26 (criticizing "homogenization" of corporate governance industry); Linda Klebe
Trevino, Out of Touch: The CEO's Role in Corporate Misbehavior, 70 BROOK. L. REv. 1195,
1196-97 (2005) (noting that Ethics Officers in charge of compliance programs "meet regularly
to benchmark and discuss best practices in ethics and legal compliance management").
159. Zaring defines "best practices" as a form of regulation that encourages regulated
parties' input and experimentation instead of handing down distinct rules. David Zaring, Best
Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 294, 297 (2006). Regulation is "horizontal" instead of
"hierarchical" insofar as organizations look to each other for the content of rules. Id. Zaring
observes that although best practices "might suggest a rather democratic form of regulatory
experimentalism," wherein organizations learn from each other and regulators publicize their
successes, "best practices usually fall short of this ideal. They are not a panacea, not always
horizontal, and often, at least in effect, not really voluntary. In short, although best practices
purport to be 'best,' there is nothing particularly 'best' about them. The rulemaking technique is
a way of obtaining common practices, not ideal ones." Id. at 297-98 (emphasis in original).
160. Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-
Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1095, 1185
(2006).
161. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REv. 989,
1024-25 (2006) (arguing for greater oversight of prosecutor's plea bargaining power). See also
Garrett, supra note 10, at 861-69 (observing that the government's agreement with KPMG
effectively regulates the manner in which accounting firms provide certain tax planning advice).
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prosecution. 162 Moreover, "regulation by prosecution" creates additional inefficiency
insofar as there exists no mechanism for a corporation to determine in advance if its
program passes muster with the prosecutors who "regulate" corporate compliance ex
post. 163
Finally, because corporate compliance programs have been married to the criminal
justice system, they may undermine attempts at creating the very type of culture that is
most likely to encourage law-abiding behavior. 164 Because compliance is judged by
prosecutors and judges, organizations appoint lawyers to design and maintain their
compliance programs. 16 Lawyers, in turn, tend to prefer command-and-control
systems. 166 Command-and-control systems, particularly those that are backed up by
singularly punitive measures such as termination, are not only extremely costly, but
they are also ineffective at creating the types of norms that encourage compliance with
internal rules and external laws. To the contrary, they may undermine employee
morale and compliance. 167
In lieu of extensive command-and-control rules, extensive monitoring systems, and
harsh disciplinary systems, some scholars have argued that organizations should direct
more of their focus to intangible items such as the development of "self-regulatory"
norms within the corporation.' 68 The focus on "norms" creation may well be more
effective over the long term than a checklist of rules and procedures that a company
implements upon the advice of its lawyers. Nevertheless, risk averse compliance
lawyers will choose the programs that intuitively "look better" to prosecutors,
regardless of whether they work. 169
162. Although Christopher Wray and Robert Hur agree that the proliferation of corporate
prosecutions raises the possibility that the government will inconsistently enforce corporate
governance standards, their proposed solution is for DOJ officials to watch for inconsistency
and, if necessary, impose a more centralized system. See Wray & Hur, supra note 160, at 1187-
88.
163. In contrast, Ayers and Braithwaite assumed that the "enforced self-regulatory" model of
compliance would include an individualized ex ante review of the corporation's compliance
program before wrongdoing was detected. IAN AYERS & JOHN BRAITHEwAiTE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 106 (1992). "Under enforced self-
regulation, the government would compel each company to write a set of rules tailored to the
unique set of contingencies facing that firm. A regulatory agency would either approve these
rules or send them back for revision if they were insufficiently stringent." Id.
164. See Tom E. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work
Settings: The Value of Self-RegulatOry Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. Rv. 1287, 1301-02 (2005)
(command-and-control systems "consume organizational resources. Even if they work, these
strategies are costly and inefficient.").
165. Langevoort, supra note 37, at 75-76 (stating that lawyers are primary "compliance
engineers" in many firms).
166. Ironically, the DOJ's "flexible" standards encourage firms to adopt command-and-
control internal compliance regimes. See Cunningham, supra note 56, at 307; Langevoort, supra
note 37, at 73.
167. Langevoort hypothesizes that lawyers in particular prefer rules and command-and-
control based systems. See Langevoort, supra note 37, at 118.
168. Tyler, supra note 164, at 1300-01 (arguing that the "self-regulatory" approach is
preferable to command-and-control systems because employees are more likely to follow rules
that conform to their ethical values and are promulgated by institutions they view as fair).
169. See Cunningham, supra note 56, at 307-09.
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2. Post-Detection Overpayment: Cooperation through Uncertainty
Overpayment continues and increases after the organization becomes the target of a
federal investigation or prosecution. Attorneys have widely criticized the DOJ's
pervasive pressure on organizational defendants to waive attorney-client privilege and
the manner in which the "culture of waiver" has chilled contact between employees
and corporate counsel. 170 Aside from the waiver issue, however, overpayment can
occur in other aspects as well.
First, companies may initiate internal investigations with the express intention of
handing over their findings to the federal government. 171 This may sound like a good
development in theory. If federal agents are already aware of (or even demand) the
investigation, however, the entity's internal investigators, who intend from the outset
to demonstrate the organization's cooperation, may concede or declare wrongdoing
more quickly than an objective fact-finder. 172
Cooperation (at least as envisioned by the DOJ) may also undermine the
organization's relationship with its employees. In a further attempt to curry favor with
the government, an organization might fire employees who are in fact innocent or, as
was the case in KPMG, coerce employees to speak with government agents by
threatening to terminate those who declined to speak with the government.
Christopher Wray and Robert Hur, both former high-level Justice Department
officials, contend that the pressure for corporations to cooperate is "merely the
outgrowth of similar leverage strategies used by prosecutors for years to 'flip'
individual targets or defendants on each other.' ' 173 This analogy, however, is
incomplete. In the individual context, the defendant comes to the table with more
leverage than the corporation. He may remain silent and despite the angst and
economic harm he may suffer from an indictment, the worst collateral effects will not
occur until he is convicted. The fact that an individual may choose to go to trial (a
choice that has more or less practical meaning depending on the defendant's individual
170. For an overview of these arguments, see Bharara, supra note 2, at 96-97 (describing
pressure on organizations to waive privilege).
171. In Stolt-Nielsen, an antitrust case, the corporation's counsel (a former DOJ antitrust
attorney) initiated an internal investigation after he had already contacted the government and
had advised it of possible illegal conduct. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. United States, 352 F. Supp.
2d. 553, 556-57 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (internal counsel purposely notified government prior to
completing investigation in order to preserve marker for company), rev'd, 442 F.3d 177 (3rd
Cir. 2006). He contacted the DOJ prior to completing his investigation because he wished to
preserve his client's chances of obtaining amnesty under the Antitrust Division's Amnesty
program. The Antitrust Division employs a corporate leniency program that immunizes the first
entity that discloses illegal conduct. For a general discussion of the program and its effect on
enforcement of antitrust violations, see Bruce H. Kobayashi, Antitrust, Agency, and Amnesty:
An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws Against Corporations,
69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 715 (2001) (arguing that excessive fines and "first to cooperate"
amnesty policy may lead to overdeterrence within firms).
172. Professor Laufer has argued that the company might purposely scapegoat an innocent
employee in order to gain the government's good will and obtain a DPA. See Laufer, supra note
18, at 1413-14.
173. Wray & Hur, supra note 160, at 1182.
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resources and access to competent counsel) moderates the bargaining that goes on
between prosecutors and individual defendants. At the very least, both parties know
that somewhere down the line, the court will get involved insofar as it metes out the
defendant's sentence.
By contrast, the "flip" in the corporate context goes to the central question of the
corporate entity's "guilt" and effectively removes the corporation from the criminal
process altogether. Because the prosecutor alone determines the severity of the "flip"
(which in turn determines the charge, if any, imposed on the entity), the prosecutor has
more leverage in the corporate context and the corporate defendant has far more
incentive to "scapegoat" innocent employees (as opposed to merely ratting out the
guilty ones). 174 Indeed, far from intentionally scapegoating employees, it may simply
go along with the prosecutor's view of the facts if the corporation's defense counsel
deems the facts to be in equipoise. Between the corporate entity's skin and the fair
treatment of a potentially innocent employee, the rational defense counsel for the entity
will-and indeed should-go along with whatever the government wants.
Cooperation also differs in the corporate context because the organization, unlike
the individual, lacks complete knowledge of what "it" has done and lacks complete
control over what "it" will do in the future. Board members who must make decisions
on the shareholder's behalf are unlikely to have a full picture of the situation before
they agree that the entity will cooperate, and they cannot exercise absolute control over
their employees after they agree that the entity will cooperate. This lack of control, in
turn, creates risk for the cooperating organization because the DPA invariably permits
the government to file charges at a later date (and use all the information the
organization has willingly handed over) if the government later learns that someone in
the organization was less than truthful. 1
75
3. Post-Detection Overpayment: Monitoring and Corporate Abdication
Overpayment also results from the monitoring and reporting systems that are often
imposed as a condition of either a DPA or, if the organization has in fact been
convicted in court, as a sentence of probation under the OSG.
174. The power exercised by way of the "flip" is also unnecessary in the corporate context
because the organization is already obligated to answer government queries for information and
documents. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
175. Boeing entered into an agreement with the DOJ that explicitly stated that future crimes
by low-level employees would not be considered a violation by Boeing. Peter Lattman,
Boeing's Non-Non Prosecution Agreement, WALL ST. J. LAW BLoG, July 6, 2006,
http://blogs.wsj.com/ law/2006/07/06/boeings-non-non-prosecution-agreement. This provision,
however, has not been widely used. In another prosecution, Stolt-Nielsen became a victim of its
lack of information when prosecutors in the Antitrust Division, having learned that one of
Stolt's employees lied to Antitrust investigators about the date he terminated his conduct in a
price-fixing cartel, withdrew their prior leniency agreement and decided to indict the company,
despite its prior cooperation efforts. See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177 (3rd
Cir. 2006) (company cannot attempt to enforce leniency agreement until after government
obtains grand jury indictment), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 494 (2006); Press Release, Dept. of
Justice, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. Indicted on Customer Allocation, Price Fixing, and Bid-Rigging
Charges for its Role in an Int'l Parcel Tanker Shipping Cartel (Sept. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2006/218199.pdf.
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To date, the benefits and drawbacks of using federal monitors to report on and
supervise corporate compliance with federal laws and civil and criminal settlements
have not been studied in depth.' 76 Professor James Jacobs has described their
usefulness in ridding unions of organized crime. 177 Corporate organizations, however,
differ significantly from unions. Whereas a monitor's role in overseeing a union may
be fairly well-defined and include at least some level of judicial oversight, the
monitor's role in establishing "good corporate governance" within a public corporation
is far more indeterminate and subject to little or no judicial oversight. 78 Recent
perceived abuses in the appointment of monitors have spurred the DOJ's recent
circulation of a memo advising United States Attorneys to avoid potential conflicts of
interest in the selection of monitors and to treat the monitor as an "independent third
party." 1
79
Because the monitor effectively reports to the government and not the
corporation, 180 the monitor may well overcharge the corporation for his services by
176. One of the few articles addressing this topic is Brandon Garrett's Structural Reform
Prosecution, which analyzes DPAs and concludes that the DOJ has "consistently pursued
compliance" through monitors and other structural reforms. Garrett, supra note 10, at 860. For
two recent discussions of issues created by corporate monitoring, see Jennifer O'Hare, The Use
of the Corporate Monitor in SEC Enforcement Actions, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 89
(2006); Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New
Corporate Czar, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713 (2007).
177. See JAMES JACOBS, MOBSTERS, UNIONS, AND FEDS: THE MAFIA AND THE AMERICAN
LABOR MOVEMENT 138-60 (discussing the use of federal monitors in the context of civil RICO
suits filed by DOJ against various unions). Borrowing a page from bank regulation, Professor
James Fanto has proposed that the SEC hire, train, and pay yearly salaries to corporate monitors
who would "engage in a constant dialogue with management of the public firm and alert
officers and directors at an early stage to problematic transactions and SEC concerns." James
Fanto, Paternalistic Regulation of Public Company Management: Lessons from Bank
Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 859,915 (2006). Although Fanto's proposal alleviates some of the
overbilling concerns discussed infra in the text, it does not solve the confidentiality and
authority issues that a monitor poses for the board and the corporation's management. Similar
problems plague Cristie Ford's proposal for independent "third party" monitors to report to the
SEC on corporate governance issues within firms. See Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Modelfor
Securities Law Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 757, 798 (2005).
178. One notable exception to the lack of oversight problem is Richard Breeden's oversight
of MCI, which occurred in the context of the MCI bankruptcy and was overseen by the district
court supervising the bankruptcy process.
179. Craig Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney General, Selection and Use of Monitors in
Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-Prosecution Agreements with Corporations, March
7, 2008, available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime-blog/files/doj-
principles.pdf [hereinafter Morford Memo] The Morford Memo was released in advance of a
March 11, 2008, House Hearing on deferred prosecution agreements and corporate monitors.
See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing on Deferred
Prosecution: Should Corporate Settlement Agreements Be Without Guidelines?, http://judiciary.
house.gov/oversight.aspx?ID-425.
180. Although the monitor has no legal obligation to report to the corporation's board,
management, or shareholders, the DOJ's newly-released Morford Memo recognizes that the
monitor may wish to communicate with both the Government and the "corporation." Morford
Memo, supra note 179, at 6. The same Memo, however, also implies that it may be appropriate
10692008]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
providing excess services or by overbilling for his services. 1 81 At the very least, the
monitor will have little incentive to minimize costs. 1
82
Second-and perhaps of greater concern-the imposition of a monitor may result in
the organizational leaders' abdication of responsibility to make decisions on behalf of
the owners and stakeholders.' 8 3 For example, the board of a publicly owned
corporation might rationally decide to leave questionable decisions to the corporate
monitor since any decision approved by the monitor is less likely to result in criminal
liability. The problem with this strategy is that the owners of the corporation did not
elect the monitor to run the business; they elected the board.
In 2005, Bristol Meyers-Squibb (BMS) signed a DPA with the United States
Attorney's office in New Jersey as a result of the United States Attorney's
investigation of channel stuffing-the practice of placing high amounts of inventory
with dealers and sellers in order to inflate sales temporarily. In exchange for foregoing
indictment, the United States Attorney demanded that BMS enter into a DPA that,
among other things, required it to employ and pay an outside monitor. 184 The monitor,
Frederic Lacey was paid by BMS, but he submitted reports and received direction from
the government. 85 Christopher Christie, the United States Attorney of New Jersey
who negotiated the DPA with BMS, argued that the DPA demonstrated "the unique
value of deferred prosecution agreements and the advantages that they offer the
government and corporate America."'
86
In the Fall of 2006, allegations of an unrelated crime (that BMS's representatives
had made a side deal with a competitor, Apotex, regarding a rival patent and Apotex's
threatened distribution of a generic version of BMS' blockbuster drug, Plavix)
triggered an investigation by the DOJ's Antitrust Division. The Antitrust Division's
new investigation, in turn, triggered an investigation by BMS's monitor and a separate
investigation by BMS's board. Shortly after the new investigation was announced, in
September 2006, the BMS board fired its CEO, Peter Dolan, and its general counsel
following a special board meeting attended by both the monitor and the United States
to communicate solely with the Government about the corporation's progress in meeting the
terms of its DPA. Id.
181. I am not suggesting that the monitor will intentionally defraud the corporation. Without
any market restraints or significant oversight, he either may provide excessive services or
charge in excess of their value.
182. Prosecutors who are supported by attenuated yearly budgets are least likely to be
sensitive to these costs.
183. The Delaware judiciary has criticized and overturned agreements in which the board
abdicates its judgment to legal advisors in the context of a merger agreement. See ACE Limited
v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 106-07 (Del. Ch. 1999) (criticizing contract provision that
delegated a merger decision to outside lawyer's legal opinion: "does it make sense for the board
to be able to hide behind its lawyers?").
184. Bristol-Myers Squib, Deferred Prosecution Agreement (June 15, 2006),
http://www.Bristol-Myers.com/static/pdf/dpa.pdf.
185. Following his appointment as monitor, Lacey and members of his law firm, LeBoef,
Lamb, Greene & MacRae "became regular fixtures at Bristol-Myers" and provided the United
States Attorneys Office with quarterly reports of 400 to 500 pages that were unavailable to the
public. See Stephanie Saul, A Corporate Nanny Turns Assertive, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, at
Cl.
186. Christie & Hanna, supra note 105, at 1044.
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Attorney, Christopher Christie. Christie allegedly demanded Dolan' s ouster during the
actual board meeting.' 
87
Nine months later, on June 11,2007, BMS pled guilty in the District of Columbia to
two counts of making false statements to the FTC, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.188
BMS admitted in court that a former employee (believed to be Dr. Andrew Bodnar)
promised a representative at Apotex (the producer of a generic rival to BMS' Plavix)
that he would oppose the launch of a BMS-produced generic version of Plavix
provided Apotex and Plavix resolved their patent dispute. 189 Bodnar also allegedly
implied in his conversation with Apotex's representative that BMS's then-CEO
supported this side deal-all of which was not disclosed to the FrC, which had been
reviewing a proposed resolution of the patent litigation between BMS and Apotex.
Despite the allegation that a BMS employee lied to the FrC, no further evidence
has surfaced that either BMS's CEO or its general counsel approved Bodnar's
statement or were even aware of it. Indeed, even as it resolved the matter with the FTC
and DOJ, BMS continued to deny that there was any side deal with Apotex. 190 The
United States Attorney's Office, meanwhile, further clouded the issue by agreeing to a
fairly light punishment (a one million dollar fine) and, more important, by announcing
that, despite the alleged crime, BMS "fulfilled" the letter and spirit of the DPA
agreement, which expired on June 14, 2007.191
The BMS episode demonstrates several problems with regulation-by-prosecution of
corporate entities. Although BMS's senior management may have completely
mishandled the company's dealings with a rival producer of a generic drug, the
remedying of that problem should have been the board's responsibility because the
board, and not the United States Attorney, answers to the company's shareholders. The
187. See Saul, supra note 185.
188. For discussion of the facts leading up to BMS's guilty plea, see Bristol-Myers Faces
Charges, L.A. TIMus, May 31, 2007, at C6; Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Bristol-
Myers Squibb Pleads Guilty to Lying to the Federal Government About Deal Involving Blood-
Thinning Drug (May 30, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/pressreleases/
2007/223634.pdf.
189. John Carreyrou, Bristol-Myers Settles Probe of Apotex Deal, WALL ST. J., May 11,
2007, at B2; Press Release, Bristol-Myers Squibb, (June 11, 2007), available at
http://newsroom.bms.com/index.php?s=press releases&item=27 1.
190. BMS's press release states in pertinent part:
The company acknowledge[s] that a former Bristol-Myers Squibb senior
executive made oral representations to Apotex for the purpose of causing Apotex
to conclude that [BMS] would not launch an authorized generic in the event that
the parties reached a final revised settlement agreement. Those representations
included the former senior executive's statement that he expected to oppose
personally the launch of an authorized generic in the future, his statement that he
expected to advocate against such a launch, and his implied suggestion that the
company's former CEO shared his views .... The company acknowledged in
court today its responsibility for the conduct of the former senior officer.
The company continues to believe that there was no "side agreement" with
Apotex.
Press Release, Bristol-Myers Squibb, (June 11,2007), available at http://newsroom.bms.com
index.php?s=press-releases&item=27 1.
191. Carreyrou, supra note 189.
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board might well have been justified in dismissing BMS's CEO and general counsel
for their lack of control over the negotiation, but the integrity of that decision was
diluted significantly by the government's presence and participation.
Moreover, while the prosecutor and monitor quickly moved for the CEO's
termination, they permitted the executive who was the alleged culprit of the "side deal"
and ultimate false statement to the FTC, to remain at the company while the
investigation was ongoing. 192 In other words, because they acted in haste and were
subject to none of the usual checks and balances of criminal litigation, the United
States Attorney and BMS monitor either placed blame in the wrong place or assumed
more serious conduct than what actually occurred. 193 Either way, they increased the
risk of error.
Finally, the manner in which the investigation was ultimately disposed-a relatively
light fine paired with the United States Attorney blessed expiration of the DPA-sent a
confusing signal to BMS's shareholders. The matter was important enough to warrant
the prosecutor's interference in the company's corporate governance, yet not so
important as to warrant an overturning of the earlier DPA. Because the prosecutor is
not required to explain his reasoning, there is little opportunity for corporate boards to
learn anything from this episode. As for BMS's shareholders, the only lesson they may
have gleaned is that for a period of time, someone other than the elected board of
directors was running their company.
II. PROPOSED REFORMS: WHY TWEAKING THE SYSTEM FALLS SHORT
Many scholars have agreed that the current system of corporate criminal liability is
problematic, but they have not agreed on a single solution. Some have called for a
stricter standard of liability' 94 and some for heightened evidentiary requirements. 1
95
Others have called for greater judicial intervention in the negotiation process. 196
A. Alteration ofLiability Standard
Many proposals alter the liability standard to limit the number of potentially liable
organizations. A narrower liability standard presumably leads to less leverage for
prosecutors and fewer instances of prosecutorial overreaching.19 7 Professor Buell, for
example, has argued that liability should attach only when the government can
demonstrate that the employee's "primary purpose" was to benefit his employer.
98
192. Bodnar's resignation was announced on May 14, 2007. See Shannon Pettypiece,
Shakers: Business Personalities in the News, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 14, 2007,
http://www.iht.cof/articles/2007/05/13/businessbxshake.php
193. Significantly, the Antitrust Division, which initiated the investigation, has not filed any
charges against BMS and its two former top executives.
194. See Buell, supra note 39, at 532 (arguing that liability should attach only when it was
employee's primary intent to benefit employer).
195. See Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 40, at 1775.
196. Greenblum, supra note 41, at 1898.
197. See Bharara, supra note 2, at 112 (arguing that Congress and the courts should develop
"clear and expert standards" in order to shift discretion away from prosecutors).
198. Buell, supra note 39, at 532.
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Buell's proposal rests on the assumption that criminal liability is warranted whenever
institutions encourage their agents to transgress the law.199 Accordingly, Buell's
"primary purpose" test is intended as a means of inferring ex post whether the
institution should be "blamed" for its wrongful "effect" on its employee.
Leaving aside the unproven proposition that formally defined "institutions"
encourage wrongdoing (as opposed to larger or smaller informal subgroups such as
one's family, one's social group, or smaller sub-units of a given corporation), Professor
Buell's proposal is particularly costly to administer insofar as it relies on two
inferences, the employee's purpose and the institution's effect on the employee.
Moreover, its outcome is difficult to predict ex ante and leaves in place both the
prosecutor as chief enforcer and arbiter, as well as the extralegal effects ofindictment. E200
Elizabeth Ainslie contends that the federal standard should be reformed to look
more like the Model Penal Code, which permits corporate liability for corporations
whenever:
(a) the offense is a violation or the offense is defined by a statute other than the
Code in which a legislative purpose to impose liability on corporations plainly
appears and the conduct is performed by an agent of the corporation acting on
behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment, except that
if the law defining the offense designates the agents for whose conduct the
corporation is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable,
such provisions shall apply; or
(b) the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative
performance imposed on corporations by law; or
(c) the commission of the offense was authorized, requested, commanded,
performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial
agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or
employment.
20
Ainslie's proposal is salutary insofar as it would, among other things, force
Congress to identify particular statutes for which it believed corporate criminal liability
was warranted. If Congress did designate such liability, however, it is difficult to see
how corporations would fare much better than now since paragraph (a)'s liability
standard is as broad as the current standard. Although Congress might decline to enact
such a law right now, the minute a new scandal appeared on the horizon, legislators
and prosecutors would hastily agree to enact laws that quickly returned us to the old
202system. Moreover, even if Congress declined to explicitly designate corporate
liability, many corporations would continue to come under prosecutorial control as a
199. Id. at 477. "The truth is that institutions do produce wrongdoing." Id. at 493.
200. Buell praises reputation effects as a means of disciplining firms. See Buell, supra note
39, at 535.
201. Model Penal Code § 2.07(1) (2001); Ainslie, supra note 18, at 120-21.
202. Stuntz, supra note 135, at 529 ("Legislators presumably want to stay in office, and
perhaps to position themselves for higher office. To do those things, legislators must please their
constituents.").
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result of paragraph (c) since most competent prosecutors could plausibly argue in most
instances that serious employee crimes were "authorized, requested, commanded,
performed, or recklessly tolerated" by a "high managerial agent." In a company the
size of Walmart or Pfizer, it should not be too difficult to find a "high managerial
agent," and it will be even less difficult to find someone who "recklessly tolerated"
such conduct.
Finally, Andrew Weissman and David Newman have called for the adoption of a
negligence standard whereby prosecutors would have to prove, as an element of their
case that the entity "failed to have reasonably effective policies and procedures to
prevent the conduct." 20 3 Thus, Weissman and Newman consciously adopt a negligence
standard of criminal liability and, unfortunately, all of the problems that come with
it. 204 Although the proposal is beneficial in that it makes prosecutors more accountable
for their decisions (they would have to actually prove that the company's processes
were deficient rather than just say so), it still leaves the definition of compliance quite
vague. As a result, ex ante it would generate uncertainty and overdeterrence among
firms. Firms would no doubt invest in showy and expensive measures designed to
impress prosecutors who would still retain the final say on whether to present the case
to a grand jury for indictment.
Moreover, the cognitive biases that attach to prosecutorial decision-making might
well filter down to courts and juries. It is difficult to perceive how hindsight bias would
not cloud a juror's determination as to whether a given corporate compliance
department's policies were "reasonably effective" when the juror becomes aware of
(presumably) numerous employee violations.
Finally, Weissman and Newman's proposed negligence rule fails to consider at least
one benefit of strict liability: efficient activity levels. Assuming certain firms-either
because of their industry or some other characteristic-are unable to mitigate their
compliance risk, we still would want to find a mechanism that internalizes their costs
to a point that they reduce their activity to efficient levels.
B. Reining in Prosecutors: Self Discipline and Judicial Oversight
A second set of reforms call for more explicit checks on prosecutorial power. 205
Professors Stein and Beirschbach suggest that in order to reduce the expost harms to
corporate entities, laws should be reformed to make corporate convictions less likely.
One way to do that, Stein and Bierschbach theorize, is to cloak the corporation with a
"removable" Fifth Amendment privilege that would prevent prosecutors from serving
subpoenas on corporations for documents unless and until prosecutors developed
separate "probable cause" that a "corporate crime" had been committed, at which time
prosecutors could seek a court warrant. 2°6 Unfortunately, Stein and Bierschbach's
proposal is either too broad or too narrow to work. If applied to all corporate
investigations, the warrant requirement would severely hamper the government's
investigation and prosecution of individual white-collar crime, the evidence of which is
203. Andrew Weissman & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82
IND. L.J. 411,414 (2007).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 74-76.
205. Greenblum, supra note 41, at 1865.
206. Bierschbach & Stein, supra note 40, at 1776.
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generated and maintained primarily in corporate files. On the other hand, if the
proposal applied solely to investigations of organizations, it would be fairly
meaningless because the documents that demonstrate individual employee crime
almost automatically demonstrate corporate liability.
In a student note, Benjamin Greenblum has proposed judicial oversight of
prosecutors to "counterbalance" prosecutorial power.207 Greenblum's proposal,
however, stops short of imposing oversight over the negotiation process, in part
because there is no doctrinal support for judicial presence in pre-indictment
negotiations. Instead, Greenblum proposes that judges adopt a "wait and see" approach
and then reinsert themselves during the implementation of the agreement. 208 Assuming
one believes that judges are less conflicted or prone to error than prosecutors,
Greenblum's proposal has merit in that it might deter or eliminate some of the more
inefficient DPA terms or prosecutorial interventions in corporate governance.
Nevertheless, the oversight itself would be inconsistent in that it would rest largely on
the judge's own views and discretion. Inconsistency, in turn, would breed uncertainty.
C. Elimination of Criminal Liability
Finally, a number of scholars have, over the years, called for the complete
elimination of corporate criminal liability, and replacing it with the tort system as a
means of regulating business entities and their monitoring of employees .209 Professors
Fischel and Sykes have argued that in all instances, the civil liability system can more
efficiently set organizational penalties for entities than criminal liability. 210 According
to Fischel and Sykes, criminal penalties are generally inefficient-in other words, they
do not approximate the malfeasor's social harm, adjusted for the probability of
detection. If an employee causes $100,000 worth of social harm and there is a one in
ten chance that his crime will be detected, the optimum penalty for his crime is a
$1,000,000 fine. 211 Any fine above that amount is excessive and likely to overdeter the
207. Greenblum, supra note 41, at 1865; see also Garrett, supra note 10, at 924 (arguing
courts could impose "reasonableness" review on DPA process).
208. This would require that all agreements be filed in court. See Greenblum, supra note 41,
at 1900.
209. See Ainslie, supra note 18, at 110-15 ("civil sanctions can generally be shaped far more
precisely to meet the targeted evil"); Khanna, supra note 34, at 1275-76 ("Most, if not all, of
the advantages of corporate criminal liability can be achieved by various forms of civil liability
at lower cost to the government and society."); Fischel & Sykes, supra note 2, at 322-24:
"[economic deterrence arguments] are not arguments for corporate criminal liability in
particular, but, rather, arguments for a set of monetary penalties, properly calibrated in light of
the social harm caused by the criminal acts of corporate agents.").
210. Fischel & Sykes, supra note 2, at 321.
211. "[A] total penalty equal to the social cost of crime, discounted by the probability of
nondetection, is an appropriate rule of thumb to use in setting the penalty." Fischel & Sykes,
supra note 2, at 325-26. Additional factors, such as the penalty's effect on enforcement costs or
likelihood of detection may also affect the penalty. Id. at 326. In addition, a proper system
should also consider the penalties imposed on the individual employee-apart from those
imposed on the organization-because the individual employee presumably will demand greater
compensation ex ante to make up for the expost damages he may suffer. Id.; see also Ronald
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. EcON. 1 (1960). This Coasian shift is rather uneven.
2008] 1075
INDIA NA LAW JOURNAL
employee and the organization tasked with monitoring him. Legislatures, according to
Fischel and Sykes, fail to follow this rule of thumb when setting penalties; instead,
they focus more on impressing the public with a get-tough-on-crime stance.
21 2
As Fischel and Sykes recognized in their 1996 article, politicians have had few
incentives to eliminate corporate crime. Between the media's coverage of corporate
scandals and the growth of a compliance industry, the public would not have looked
favorably on legislation that freed corporations from criminal liability, even if it
exposed them to vicarious liability in civil form. Moreover, putting aside the difficult
question of whether the criminalization of an entity's lack of monitoring retains any
expressive value, the wholesale decriminalization of entity-based corporate crime
might send unintended signals that entities can ignore (or even encourage) their
employees' misconduct.
This is not a concern to be taken lightly. As most commentators would agree, fraud
is bad for the securities markets, and the corporate form should not be used as a shield
to hide and perpetuate criminal conduct. However, some of these worries could be
alleviated through, among other things, increases in individual criminal liability for
certain offenses, such as perjury and obstruction of justice. This would demonstrate to
firms that the withholding of properly requested information will not be tolerated.
Obstructive conduct by entities could be deterred through civil or administrative
provisions such as fines, denial of permits or other similar measures.
In any event, Fischel and Sykes' article concerns itself primarily with the question
of why entity-level criminal liability is inappropriate. It does not focus on how we
might move from a criminal regime to a primarily civil regime with improved
monitoring incentives. Part III of this Article therefore suggests such a mechanism.
III. INSURING CORPORATE CRIME: THE PROPOSAL FOR COMPLIANCE INSURANCE
The essential problem with composite criminal liability is that it causes
organizations to overpay for their employees' actual and potential crimes before and
after they become targets of federal investigations.2 1 3 Inspired by their healthy fear of
the DOJ and the extralegal consequences of indictment, business entities are likely to
adopt overly expensive monitoring and compliance systems and agree to suboptimal
settlement terms with prosecutors. Moreover, the current regime, although supposedly
less taxing than pure strict liability, continues to create a false expectation of near
perfection despite the fact that perfect compliance at any cost is neither possible nor
desired. 214
When liability is aimed primarily at the corporation and not the manager, the corporation will
have a difficult time shifting liability back to the manager because negotiation with management
is not arm's length. Khanna, supra note 34, at 1255. This problem, however, would seem to be
limited to top managers and not all employees.
212. According to Professor Stuntz, this tendency toward criminalization is shared and
supported by prosecutors. See Stuntz, supra note 135, at 534 ("[A]t the most basic level, elected
legislators and elected prosecutors are natural allies."). Although Stuntz was referring to elected
prosecutors, this alliance should extend to political appointees as well.
213. "[B]ecause the costs of excessive monitoring must be recovered through prices,
improperly high penalties create additional inefficiencies because the price of goods or services
produced by corporations will exceed their social costs." Fischel & Sykes, supra note 2, at 324.
214. See Cunningham, supra note 56, at 308-09 (discussing perception gap between legal
culture's expectation of "absolute assurance" and reality of leakiness); Fischel & Sykes, supra
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Corporate employees are human beings with complex motivations. As Professor
Macey has observed, they may commit crimes to mask subpar performance, to comply
with what they view as the prevailing corporate or industrial culture, or simply because
they misunderstand the law. 15 Although education, indoctrination, and monitoring can
correct some of these problems, they inevitably will fall short; organizations are not
and will never be all-knowing or omnipotent. Ceaseless efforts at monitoring may
hamper an organization's legitimate business goals either by redirecting resources from
more socially beneficial activity or by undermining the employees' morale, loyalty, or
entrepreneurial creativity.21
6
This Article proposes 217 compliance insurance as a plausible solution to the
overpayment problem. 218 Unlike the current system, which forces organizations to
guess at how well they should self-insure, a "compliance insurance" system would
create a market that would enable its participants to: (a) measure a corporation's
compliance risk ex ante; (b) pool and reduce aggregate risks; (c) monitor and control
corporate compliance by charging the corporation a premium based on its calculated
risk; and (d) retain funds for victims of wrongdoing. Under this system, business
entities would retain the incentive to monitor their employees to the extent such
monitoring was cost effective. Prosecutorial excess and mindless devotion to
compliance for the compliance industry's sake, however, would disappear because
prosecutors and compliance professionals would be replaced by a totally different set
of agents: the insurance carrier and the regulators who set minimum coverage targets
for insureds.21 9
note 2, at 346 (compliance at all costs not desirable); Langevoort, supra note 37, at 73
(perfection not possible).
215. Jonathan Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U.
L. Rev. 315, 326-32 (1991) (describing three primary causes of corporate crime). For further
discussion of how corporate culture allegedly causes crime, see generally Ford, supra note 116,
at 762.
216. Baysinger argues that corporate compliance programs should be judged like any other
corporate output: "Like other aspects of production, the outputs of compliance programs must
be judged realistically: no system that is cost effective and otherwise tolerable to live with can
be absolutely foolproof." Barry Baysinger, Organization Theory and the Criminal Liability of
Organizations, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 341, 367-68 (1991).
217. Because of the uncertainties about whether and how a market would function, my
proposal presumes that the program would be optional for a defined period of time. After the
market was established, the regime could become mandatory for organizations above a certain
size in terms of capitalization or employees. Cf Richard Epstein, Imperfect Liability Regimes:
Individual and Corporate Issues, 53 S.C. L. REv. 1153, 1160-61 (2002) (discussing benefits of
mandatory insurance tort regime for small corporations). Whether compulsory compliance
insurance is necessary or advisable, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
218. By "insurance," I mean the company's purchase of insurance from an insurance carrier,
who pools and aggregates the risks of multiple organizations. I do not mean "self-insurance,"
which the current regime of corporate criminal liability effectively requires. See Laufer, supra
note 18, at 1349 (explaining how corporate compliance has become "a carefully conceived and
arguably overpriced form of risk management that serves as an insurance function").
219. Admittedly, the process for devising a schedule of minimum coverage could itself
become quite complex and/or inefficient, particularly if the regulator who set a mandatory
schedule of minimum insurance set amounts too high or too low as a result of making incorrect
assumptions or becoming politically captured by one or more parties. See Hanson & Logue,
supra note 95, at 1267 (discussing information inefficiencies of performance-based regulation).
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To some degree, insurance carriers have already begun to encroach on this territory.
Contemporary D&O policies extend coverage not only to the costs of defending
directors and officers against claims of wrongdoing (which the industry often refers to
as "Side A" coverage), but also to entity-based securities claims ("Side C"
coverage). 220 This proposal would extend insurance coverage (either through the D&O
policy or some separate policy) to nearly all instances of entity liability for individual
employee criminal conduct. 221
This proposal also bears some resemblance to financial statement insurance (FSI),
which Professors Ronen and Cunningham, respectively, have proposed and
amplified.2 2 Under Professor Ronen's and Cunningham's proposals, instead of hiring
auditors to review financial statements, corporations purchase FSI from carriers to
insure the reliability of their financial statements. To judge the risks imposed by
financial statements, carriers hire auditors to audit the corporate insureds. Thus, instead
of working directly for corporate managers (creating an inherent conflict of interest),
If the schedule were transparent, however, and subject to the ordinary rule-making notice and
comment procedures outlined by the APA, the inefficiencies would likely be less than those
caused by the processes described in Part I of this Article.
220. See Griffith, supra note 44, at 1167-68.
Coverage under Side A (referred to as Insurance Clause 1 in some policies)
provides coverage to individual insureds where the company is legally or
financially unable to indemnify them. Coverage under Side B (or Insuring Clause
2 in some policies) provides corporate reimbursement coverage to the extent the
company indemnifies the individual directors and officers, usually in excess of a
large deductible. Finally, many traditional D&O policies today also include Side C
coverage that provides entity coverage for securities claims, again in excess of a
large deductible.
John C. Tanner and David E. Howard, Blowing Whistles & Climbing Ladders, 23 No. 4. ACC
Docket 32 (April 2005) at 50. Professor Coffee has explained that Side C coverage came about
because of allocation issues that arose when both the corporation and managers were sued in
class action suits. Carriers would "demand an allocation of the defense costs between their
clients [the individual directors and officers] and the corporation... [and] thereby plac[e] the
individual defendants at risk for these payments." Accordingly, in or about 1996, carriers began
to extend entity-based coverage, "which directly reimbursed the corporation for its own
litigation expenses, its own settlement payments in securities cases, and certain other forms of
litigation." Coffee, supra note 115, at 1569-70.
221. Entity-based policies do not currently cover losses caused by fraudulent or dishonest
conduct. See David T. Case and Matthew L. Jacobs, Insurance Coverage for Governmental
Investigations of Financial Institutions, 123 BANKING L.J. 256, 260 (2006); supra note 127.
222. Ronen, supra note 44, at 48 ("We need to create ... an agency relationship between the
auditor and an appropriate principal---one whose economic interests are aligned with those of
investors, who are the ultimate intended beneficiaries of the auditor's attestation.... [I]nsurance
carriers are an eminently reasonable candidate."). See also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big
to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure the Industry Before It Unravels,
106 COLUM. L. REv. 1698, 1738-47 (2006) [hereinafter Cunningham, Too Big To Fail];
Cunningham, supra note 44; Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Model Financial Statement
Insurance Act, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 69 (2004). Other scholars have called for the imposition of
limited strict liability to force auditors to behave "more like insurers." Frank Partnoy, Strict
Liability For Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REv. 365, 375 (2004); see
also Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposalfor a Modified Strict Liability
Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001); Coffee, Gatekeeper Reform, supra note 45, at 349.
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auditors work for, and their interests are instead aligned with, insurance carriers, who
in turn are financially bonded by FSI policies. 223 Whereas FSI is intended to combat
the inherent conflict of interest that undermines the auditor's independence and
credibility when assessing financial statements, compliance insurance, in contrast,
prices the cost of corporate noncompliance rather than criminalizing it. 224 As such, it
places entity responsibility for corporate crime back under the tort umbrella. Moreover,
unlike financial statement insurance, which pertains only to financial statements, 22
compliance insurance would relate to potentially all types of criminal conduct by an
entity's employees.
An outline of compliance insurance and how it might work is set forth below.
A. General Outline of the Program
Imagine a public company known as C Corp. C Corp employs thousands of
employees across several states. C Corp produces, markets, and sells products and
services to private and public entities, including local, state, and federal agencies. C
Corp has hired a compliance officer and additional employees who routinely educate
the organization about the law, and it has instituted an ethics hot-line and a Code of
Business Conduct to improve its corporate culture. Periodically, C Corp's compliance
officer updates C Corp's audit committee on the company's compliance program.
Nevertheless, despite the company's publicly stated commitment to compliance, C
Corp still finds that some of its employees commit crimes in the course of their
employment, even though such conduct is prohibited by C Corp's ethics code and
corporate policies. Because C Corp sells products and services to government agencies
and because some of these services are covered by any number of federal regulations,
C Corp's business would be significantly damaged by a corporate indictment. If
investigated, C Corp would most likely agree to virtually any DPA term in order to
avoid a criminal indictment, even though these concessions might not be in the best
interests of its shareholders, employees, or customers.
Now imagine that if C Corp purchases a specified minimum amount of insurance
coverage, it can opt out of the criminal system. Henceforth, C Corp's employees'
crimes will, at worst, result only in civil penalties resulting from lawsuits initiated by
private or government parties. These penalties will be paid by C Corp's insurance
policy or C Corp itself in the event those penalties exceed the limits set by the policy.
Instead of acting as a defacto insurer for all its employees' criminal conduct (in which
the rates are set ex post by prosecutors), C Corp will pay ex ante for the costs
associated with the risk of those crimes by obtaining insurance from an underwriter
called Underwriter U.
223. See Cunningham, Too Big to Fail, supra note 222, at 1742. In his latest article,
Cunningham suggests that FSI should be mandatory instead of optional. Id. at 1738.
224. "[Tjhe criminal law prohibits while the civil law prices." Coffee, supra note 58, at 1884
(criticizing legislative habit of criminalizing violations of agency-promulgated regulations).
225. Under Ronen's proposal, instead of paying auditors to audit the corporation's financial
statements, corporate managers would purchase financial statement insurance from insurance
carriers. To assess their risk of payout, insurance carriers would employ auditors to review the
corporate books. This alters the agency cost problem because auditors are no longer paid by the
very party (corporate managers) that they are auditing. Ronen, supra note 44, at 48-49.
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Underwriter U sells a product known as "compliance insurance." Compliance
insurance might be an extension of either a general commercial liability policy or Side
C of a D&O policy; 226 it covers the entity for all entity-based penalties and fines
resulting from its employees' criminal conduct. Unlike the current D&O policy,
however, it extends beyond wrongdoing to conduct that has been labeled criminal.
Since C Corp has purchased a minimum amount of compliance insurance, it is no
longer criminally liable as an entity for its employees' conduct. It may, however, still
be liable civilly to either private lawsuits or claims brought by administrative agencies.
Compliance insurance would cover some or all of these claims.
To begin the process, C Corp would approach Underwriter U and request a proposal
for a compliance insurance policy. Underwriter U would then review C Corp's
compliance program, its compensation policies, its history of misconduct and any other
aspects of its business that Underwriter U deemed relevant to C Corp's risk of
employee criminal misconduct. 227 Pursuant to this inquiry, C Corp would give
Underwriter U substantial access to C Corp's personnel, policies, and
documentation. 22 8 Because Underwriter U would be in the business of evaluating
compliance programs, Underwriter U would possess substantial information about not
only C Corp's program but also about similar programs administered by corporations
in similar industries or of similar size. Thus Underwriter U's policy would be a
function of: (a) C Corp's historical conduct and compliance structure; (b) C Corp's
industry, structure, number of employees, or other factors that affect compliance risk
but are not necessarily unique to a particular company or its compliance program; and
(c) competition within the "compliance insurance" market.
Following Underwriter U's review, Underwriter U would present C Corp with a
proposal for compliance insurance, which could be either a separate policy or a
component of the entity's general liability or D&O policy. The proposal would include
a premium, a deductible, and a schedule of insurance coverage. The proposal might
also include restrictions, exceptions, or compliance reforms mandated by Underwriter
226. A D&O policy covers directors, officers, and insured entities for litigation against
directors and officers for violations of fiduciary duty. D&O policies are most often paid out for
shareholder litigation.
227. Insurance carriers already perform some of these tasks when assessing risks for D&O
policies. See Tom Baker & Sean Griffith, Predicting Governance Risk. Evidence From the
Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Market, 74 CHI. L. REv. 487 (2007) [hereinafter
Baker & Griffith, Predicting Governance Risk]; James Cox, Private Litigation and the
Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 31-32 (Fall 1997); Griffith,
supra note 44, at 1175.
228. Because compliance risk would include matters known to internal counsel, Underwriter
U might request privileged information and/or access to C Corp's privileged documents. A
similar issue has already been flagged with regard to auditors who review financial statements.
See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 19, at 1052. As a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
auditors have begun to demand from corporate clients documents that historically were
considered covered by the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 1052-53. Although the ABA Task
Force did not take a formal position on the issue, it noted with apparent approval the suggestion
that Congress enact selective waiver legislation that would permit corporations to supply
materials to auditors but maintain the attorney-client privilege or work product protection with
regard to other parties. Id. at 1055 & n.106. Similar legislation could apply to compliance
insurance.
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U, as a result of its review of C Corp's policies and past experience. If C Corp were a
large entity, it might likely secure policies from multiple carriers, each of which would
insure a certain level of liability above the primary amount insured by Underwriter U.
In order to ensure an appropriate reserve of funds for victims of criminal acts, the
federal government would specify a minimum schedule of coverage that C Corp must
purchase in order to opt out of entity-based criminal liability, which would remain the
default system.2 29 The schedule might be based on some combination of named factors
such as the company's capitalization, number of employees, and type of industry; or it
might rely on other relevant factors. C Corp would pay the premium, and Underwriter
U would adopt C Corp's risk and pool it with the risks of other companies. By pooling
the risk, the insurance system could reduce the aggregate costs of employee
noncompliance across the pool.
B. Damages and Claims
Compliance insurance is preferable to corporate criminal liability if it more
efficiently encourages entities to identify, quantify, and reduce their compliance risks
ex ante but also continues to compensate victims ex post.230 This system therefore
would have to pay attention to the manner by which it compensated the victims of C
Corp's employees' criminal conduct.2 3
It is important to note that the purpose of this proposal is not to generate new
private causes of action or reduce the corporate employee's individual criminal
liability. Moreover, one of the goals of this proposal is to maintain some level of
compensation for those harmed by corporate executives and who otherwise would
remain unpaid by judgment proof individuals. Accordingly, this proposal would
replace corporate criminal liability with civil penalties assessed by courts and sought
primarily by civil government attorneys (which is already largely the case due to
parallel litigation under numerous regulatory regimes), and require corporations to
purchase minimum insurance coverage to cover these penalties.232
229. Critics will argue that the federal regulator who sets the schedule will likely re-
introduce inefficiencies into the system. Cf Hanson & Logue, supra note 95, at 1281 ("[The
process] place[s] huge information demands on regulators .... Without perfect information,
regulators will set prices too high or too low, and they will be unable to respond properly to
changes in the amount of harm a product does."). However, assuming the regulator published
the schedule and its factors every year and made this schedule available for notice and
comment, it would be far more transparent and still less inefficient than the current system.
230. Some might argue that this system makes sense only for economic crimes (which are
the bulk of crimes that occur within corporate settings) and not those employee crimes that lack
a readily quantifiable value, such as obstruction ofjustice. (I am thankful for Steve Schulhofer' s
comment on this distinction). Although certain crimes may cause valuation problems, those
problems would persist regardless of whether the underlying crime resulted in either criminal or
civil fines imposed on the entity.
231. Since this system presupposes the elimination of corporate criminal liability, the
insurance carriers would take on the organization's liability in tort for all civil fines and
penalties assessed as a result of the organization's employees' criminal misconduct.
232. Since some criminal statutes do not have a civil or regulatory component, Congress
might enact an omnibus statute permitting civil government lawsuits on behalf of victims
against corporations whose employees were found guilty of federal crimes. This would ensure
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Thus, the proposal would move entity-based liability back into the realm of tort law.
To be efficient, the standard of liability would be composite, presumably with a strict
liability phase followed by a penalty phase that would reflect the harm caused by the
corporation's employees, modified by the likelihood of detection, plus some reduction
or reward for monitoring and self-reporting.233
The reward is necessary to induce firms to monitor and report offenses. If
Underwriter U's premium and coverage is linked to the carrier's assessment as to how
much money it is likely to pay out for C Corp's employee crimes, its risk calculation
will include not only the likelihood and magnitude of crimes committed by C Corp's
employees, but also the likelihood that the those crimes will be detected.234 This, in
turn, will create the same perverse problems that Professors Arlen and Kraakman
observed for all strict liability regimes.235 In other words, if Underwriter U charges a
higher premium because C Corp's compliance program increases the likelihood of
detection without sufficiently decreasing losses caused by criminal harm, C Corp will
either shut down its compliance program or erect a fake one.
Thus, as predicted by professors Arlen and Kraakman, entity liability for employee
crimes in a civil system will function best under a system of composite liability,
whereby judges and juries (and thereby carriers) reward firms for monitoring and self-
reporting. On the other hand, to the extent such a reward is offered expost, firms may
ex ante devise otherwise inefficient monitoring and compliance regimes designed to
impress juries and judges (and to a lesser degree, carriers), much as they currently fund
compliance regimes with an eye toward impressing prosecutors. 236 These are certainly
problems; but despite them, the resulting system still would be preferable to corporate
criminal liability.
First, the legal standard that would determine if and when the corporation was
entitled to the reward would be more transparent and subject to correction. Judicial
determinations of whether a given entity was entitled to a penalty reduction would be
placed on the record in writing and would be subject to appeal. Firms could exercise
their right to appeal without fear of the collateral consequences of a criminal
indictment.
that the federal government had the same ability to pursue corporate entities civilly for the same
crimes that previously would have triggered corporate criminal liability. The difference, of
course, is that corporations would be forced to insure the liability, and the collateral
consequences of criminal indictment (and the leverage accruing to the prosecutor as a result of
those consequences) would drop out.
233. This article presumes that corporations would continue to be held strictly liable (albeit
with some encouragement for self-reporting) for their employees' crimes. I choose strict
liability as a baseline because: (a) employees may be insolvent and therefore entity liability will
prevent the employee's moral hazard; and (b) the costs and errors associated with discerning
negligent monitoring outweigh the value of a negligence scheme.
234. The expected value would be a multiple of the expected criminal penalty for a given
crime multiplied by the probability of detection.
235. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 33, at 707-09. Although presumably the same
problem should plague D&O liability (whereby increased corporate governance leads to greater
detection but not a sufficient decrease in actual wrongdoing), Griffith does not address it. See
Griffith, supra note 44, at 1181 ("By continually optimizing its governance structure, a
corporation ought to find that it pays consistently less for D&O insurance than its
competitors.").
236. I am grateful to Professor Krawiec for bringing up this point.
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Second, it would spur less uncertainty. Organizations would base their conduct on
judicial decisions and jury verdicts, and not by guessing how the latest United States
Attorney (or the department as whole) would handle a given offense. Obviously, some
level of uncertainty would remain (particularly in the beginning while the standard was
taking shape), but not as much as exists within the current system.
Third, it would eliminate errors and inefficiency currently caused by prosecutorial
biases and conflicts of interest. Jurors and judges would determine the penalty based
on the organization's prior conduct and not on future promises to assist in the
prosecution of designated employees. This is not to say that the company should be
given a free pass to obstruct justice. Separate civil fines for obstruction (and separate
criminal prosecutions for those who intentionally hindered a federal investigation)
would be implemented and encouraged. However, the concept of prosecutorial
cooperation would no longer clog up the concept of composite liability, which should
be used to encourage ex ante monitoring and self-reporting.
C. Who Is Covered? Moral Hazard and Fortuity
The strongest argument against insurance will be the fear of moral hazard. In other
words, if insurance buffets the consequences of bad behavior, insureds engage in more
of that behavior.237 Moral hazard is arguably the reason that state courts reject
insurance of criminal conduct as a matter of public policy. 238 At the same time, most
state courts have upheld insurance contracts for punitive damages when the insured is
only vicariously liable.239 The principle that appears to divide the insurable from the
noninsurable conduct is fortuity. If the insured has complete control over how and
when the act will happen, the act cannot and should not be insured. On the other hand,
if the insured knows only that there is a great risk that an event will occur, the event is
insurable because it is fortuitous.
In the context of corporate crime, the criminal act is fortuitous when it is beyond the
control of the entity that purchases the insurance. If one defines the "insured" as the
organization's control group (i.e., the board of directors and senior executive officers),
then fortuity fails to exist whenever control group members commit crimes. 24 0 State
237. See generally Tom Baker, On the Geneaology of Moral Hazard, 75 TEx. L. REv. 237,
270 (1996).
238. See Nw. Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1962) (proclaiming
insurance against criminal penalties void and against public policy in deciding against
insurability of punitive damages); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable
Costs ofAccidents, 64 MD. L. REV. 409, 421-32 (2005) (discussing debate over insurability of
punitive damages and suggesting that insurability should fall along lines of whether conduct
was intentional instead of whether given relief is labeled compensatory or punitive).
239. Sharkey, supra note 238, at 428-29 ("Most of the states that prohibit insurance for
punitive damages on public policy grounds nonetheless permit that insurance when punitive
damages are vicariously (as opposed to directly) assessed against a defendant."). See also
Deborah Travis, Comment, Broker Churning: Who is Punished? Vicariously Assessed Punitive
Damages in the Context of Brokerage Houses and Their Agents, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1775, 1812
(1994) (explaining that as of 1988, all but three states permitted insurance of vicarious punitive
damages).
240. This at least provides a doctrinal backdrop to the otherwise completely intuitive notion
that management's participation in a criminal act should result in greater penalties for the
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courts have adopted the control-group theory when considering the insurability of
punitive damages for corporations that have been held vicariously liable for their
employees' misconduct.241 Because an employee's crime is as fortuitous to his
employer as his tort, there should be no logical barrier preventing the extension of this
rule to criminal conduct.
242
If, on the other hand, the "insured" is perceived as the collective group of
shareholders who bear the cost of insurance, then insurance should apply in all
instances of employee crime, except where the owner-such as a controlling
shareholder in a closely held corporation-has participated in the crime. In other
words, the shareholder's purchase of insurance through the corporation makes the
shareholder no more likely to commit criminal conduct. 243 The control group's
purchase of entity level insurance, assuming it is structured in a way as to not alleviate
directors' and officers' personal criminal liability, need not cause this problem either.
The moral hazard problem only occurs when managers and directors purchase entity-
level insurance that covers not only the entity's liabilities, but also the directors' and
officers' individual liabilities. 244 Accordingly, to prevent moral hazard, compliance
insurance would apply only to entity-based penalties; in no circumstances would it
apply to monetary penalties assessed on individuals through the criminal justice
system.
Between the two rules-control group or ownership-the ownership rule adheres
more faithfully to the notion of the corporate form and seems more sympathetic to the
problem of agency costs. If there is a separation between management and ownership,
then any crime-whether it is committed by a lowly employee or a CEO-is
unintentional and fortuitous insofar as a public shareholder is concerned. If
shareholders foot the bill for the company's insurance, it is a double insult that in
addition to suffering the costs of agency shirking, shareholders must also lose the
benefit of their insurance bargain through conduct over which they inherently have
little or no control. In fact, even though current D&O liability insurance policies
exclude coverage for the director's intentional criminal acts, most policies sever this
exclusion for outside directors when management's conduct is deliberately fraudulent
organization. See generally Khanna, supra note 34.
241. See Michael A. Pope, Punitive Damages: When, Where and How They Are Covered, 62
DEF. COUNSEL J. 539, 541 (1995) ("If the persons responsible for the corporation's misconduct
are officers or directors of the corporation, the misconduct is generally attributed directly to the
corporation.").
242. Cf Sharkey, supra note 238, at 432 (criticizing label-based approach to deciding
availability of insurance for punitive damages). The resistance to insuring criminal liability-
even liability that is vicarious in nature-may stem from the historical fears that insurance fuels
crime. See Baker, supra note 237, at 259 (explaining that morality of insurance is linked to
exclusion of criminals and those "linked with" criminals).
243. It might increase overall investment in corporations if shareholders believe an insurance
system results in less waste and uncertainty than under a corporate criminal liability regime.
244. This in fact has become the problem with D&O insurance. The corporation not only
purchases D&O insurance for the directors and officers, but it also purchases Side C coverage
for entity-level penalties incurred during securities litigation. Because one insurer covers
everything, directors and officers need not worry about allocation or contribution, except where
the penalties exceed coverage. Coffee, supra note 115, at 1567 ("[If the settlement is fully
covered by the corporation's own liability insurance... the board has little reason to resist a
settlement that involves no contribution by the individual defendants.").
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or otherwise violates the terms of the insurance policy. 245 Severability provisions such
as these "protect innocent outside directors' coverage from the misconduct of inside
managers." 246 If such protection is available for outside directors, then, one might
reasonably wonder why the same protections should not be available for (presumably)
innocent shareholders in a public corporation. Finally, it is easier and cheaper to
adjudicate an ownership rule than a control group rule, which is highly contextual and
fact-specific.247
Unfortunately, since most states adhere to a control-group rule, the adoption of an
ownership rule would incur transaction costs. Although the federal government retains
the power to regulate insurance under the Commerce Clause (presumably where either
the carriers or the organizations purchasing the insurance operate in interstate
248
commerce), insurance has nevertheless explicitly been delegated to the states by the
1944 McCarran-Ferguson Act. 249 Replacing the control group test of vicarious liability
with the ownership rule would require Congress to partially repeal McCarran-Ferguson
and expressly preempt state laws. If a legislator were to consider the opposing rules,
she would have to balance the administrative efficiencies of the ownership rule against
the political costs of upending the control-group rule.
Assuming an ownership rule were adopted (and promulgated through federal
legislation that preempted state insurance laws), the following scenarios could result:
If C Corp is a closely held corporation and its owners are committing crimes, C
Corp will be denied compliance insurance coverage because insurance would present a
moral hazard in this instance. Without compliance insurance, both C Corp and its
owners may be charged criminally and held subject to substantial penalties.25 °
245. Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58
STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1087 (2006) ("[P]olicies are now widely available that provide for full
severability with respect to both conduct exclusions and the insurer's right to rescind the
policy.").
246. Id.
247. One way to shore up an ownership rule is to require that all insurance contracts are
negotiated and approved by independent directors. Cf Coffee, supra note 115, at 1575
(suggesting that SEC require independent directors to examine proposed class action settlements
to prevent self-dealing).
248. See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
249. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2000):
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several
States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation
or taxation of such business by the several States.
Over the years, commentators have periodically called for a repeal of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act on various grounds. See Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United
States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 625, 641-44 (1998) (discussing Congressional
criticism of state regulation of insurance). Following the terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001, Congress partially preempted state regulation of insurance with the passage of
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322.
250. Under this analysis, partnerships ordinarily would be ineligible for such insurance as
well.
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Prosecutors will retain the same power over the privately held C Corp and its
employees.
If C Corp is a public corporation and it has purchased a minimum floor of
compliance insurance, it will no longer be subject to criminal prosecution for its
employees' criminal acts. If employee crimes occur, civil attorneys may pursue C Corp
for entity-level fines or other penalties, which will be set by a court. Underwriter U
will pay those fines and may in fact defend the litigation. Finally, if C Corp detects
employee crime and promptly reports that crime to its carrier, Underwriter U,
corresponding penalties will be decreased and Underwriter U will presumably pass
along those benefits through a cheaper policy.
Continuing with the assumption that C Corp is a public corporation and has
purchased compliance insurance, if it fails to detect criminal conduct or its top
executives participate in criminal conduct, C Corp still will be covered by the
insurance policy, but its civil penalties may be higher. Following the incident,
Underwriter U may drop C Corp as a client, charge C Corp higher premiums or insist
that C Corp change its governance structures. To prevent this consequence, C Corp
must improve its employee screening, adopt better crime detection mechanisms, or
adjust production levels to a socially optimal level.251
D. Claims, Occurrences, and Adjudication
Once an organization successfully obtained coverage, its employees' subsequent
criminal misconduct would no longer subject it to entity-level criminal liability. Thus,
for covered entities, the DOJ's internal charging memos and the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines would cease to be relevant. Individual employees, however,
would remain criminally liable for their wrongdoing.
That still leaves the question of who initiates the claim. Because corporate criminal
liability is premised on the idea that the United States was itself a victim or represents
"the people" generally as a victim, one could imagine a system in which government
attorneys (either agency attorneys or attorneys employed by the civil division of the
United States Attorneys offices and the DOJ) would continue to file claims where
violations of federal laws were concerned; payments either would compensate
identifiable victims or go to the public fisc. Class actions and other private methods of
enforcement would be unchanged by this proposal.
Admittedly, this proposal presumes that government attorneys who prosecute civil
suits are subject to fewer conflicts of interest, greater judicial oversight, and more
accountability than their counterparts in the DOJ's Criminal Division. The proposal
also assumes that in most cases, carriers would assume control of the company's
defense in court.
252
251. There is some evidence that auditors charge higher fees to issuers with higher liability
risks. See Coffee, Gatekeeper Reform, supra note 45, at 348-49 (expressing concern that auditor
screening may drive law-abiding firms from the market); Partnoy, supra note 222, at 374 (citing
Ronald A. Dye, Auditing Standards, Legal Liability, and Auditor Wealth, 101 J. POL. ECON.
887, 908 (1993)).
252. D&O carriers do not assume defense of claims, which unfortunately perits greater ex
post loss. In other words, management will settle any claim that does not exceed the coverage
amount. Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The
1086 [Vol. 83:1035
INSURING CORPORATE CRIME
In some cases, insurance companies would simply settle with the government.
Unlike DPAs, however, the carriers' settlements would be approved by a federal judge.
Accordingly, it is less likely that settlements would include terms designed to leverage
the prosecutor's prosecution of individual employees. Moreover, where the
government sought too high a payout (or disagreed that an entity was entitled to a
reduction in penalty owing to its compliance program), insurance carriers (and
companies, to the extent the government sought penalties in excess of the coverage
amount) would have incentives to litigate the claim at trial. 3 Unlike the current
system, which forces corporate defendants to settle because they fear the extralegal
costs of an indictment, carriers would have no such fears. The government would have
no more power over the carrier than it does over any civil litigant.
Although the burden of proof technically would shift from "beyond a reasonable
doubt" to "preponderance of evidence," this shift would nevertheless result in less
overall liability for most firms because: (a) collateral consequences would decrease
substantially; and (b) penalties would be assessed by courts and juries and not
prosecutors. 254
Finally, to best align the underwriter's interests with that of shareholders and the
government in deterring crime, claims would be made on an occurrence basis. In other
words, if the government brought a claim in year three for a crime that took place in
year one, the underwriter that wrote the policy for year one would be on the hook for
payment. 255
E. Disclosure and Market Signals
For public companies, disclosure of Compliance Insurance is desirable because it
256
can alert investors as to whether a particular company is at risk of noncompliance.
Insofar as the insurance underwriter is measuring and assessing the corporation's
Directors'and Officers 'Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795,1813-17 (2007) [hereinafter Baker
& Griffith, Missing Monitor]; see also Baker, supra note 227, at 270 (discussing expost losses
and moral hazard). In other insurance contexts, such as commercial liability, carriers take over
the entire defense of the claim. Baker & Griffith, Missing Monitor, supra at 1814. It is unclear
how compliance insurance would function in this context. Again, if the insurance contracts were
negotiated and approved by outside directors, carriers might obtain the right to defend the claim,
rather than reimburse the corporation for its own defense.
253. Assuming a strict liability regime, litigation costs should be lower than current costs
under a criminal regime. Ideally, compliance insurance would assume some of the
characteristics of "first party insurance" in that the finder of fact should not focus time and
energy on how or why the crime was committed by the given employee. Cf MARK GEISTFELD,
PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABiLrrY 55-56 (2006).
254. As the role of criminal prosecutors decreased, regulatory agencies might see their role
increase under this system. Overall, this should be a good result. See Gerard E. Lynch, The Role
of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 35 (1997)
(preferring "expert regulators" to criminal prosecutors in field of corporate crime). However,
inefficient aspects of the criminal process, such as overly intrusive unbonded monitors, might
reappear through civil and regulatory settlements. I leave these worries for future consideration.
255. See Cox, supra note 227, at 33 (criticizing the fact that D&O insurance is on a claims
made and not occurrence basis).
256. Griffith theorizes that disclosure of D&O premiums creates an additional incentive to
reduce the premiums and improve governance. See Griffith, supra note 44, at 1181-82.
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compliance program, the insurer bears some resemblance to the auditors, credit rating
agencies and lawyers who assess and review corporate controls on a regular basis and
who are regularly deemed corporate "gatekeepers." Either the SEC or Congress could
require C Corp (and any other public company) to disclose its yearly compliance
insurance policy in public filings. To the extent that compliance insurance policies
bore similar standardized characteristics for groups of similarly situated corporations
(or for example, a given corporation's policy remained stable over time), these policies
would send signals to the investor markets, which analysts and institutional
shareholders could further question and explore.257 Disclosure would increase
transparency and create an additional incentive for C Corp to improve its compliance
program. 
258
F. Potential Challenges
Despite its benefits, numerous problems may arise in the attempt to implement
Compliance Insurance. I address some of the more prominent ones here.
1. Reductions in Prosecutions of Individual Employees
Prosecutors would most likely object to an insurance-based system on the grounds
that the government cannot effectively prosecute individual employees unless it has the
ability to pressure companies to hand over information and cooperate.2 59 Although this
should remain an important concern, it is not insurmountable. Aside from the
government's overwhelming power to obtain documents through subpoenas and search
warrants, the government would also retain the benefit of (1) whistleblower hotlines;
(2) provisions that have strengthened gatekeeper oversight by attorneys and auditors;
(3) federal statutes and sentencing guidelines that subject even minor participants to
prohibitively high sentences (thus increasing the attraction of individual cooperation
agreements); and (4) numerous regulatory controls (such as civil fines and contempt
orders) that regulators could employ when organizations affirmatively attempted to
shield employees from blame. Moreover, when board members or upper management
appeared to be intentionally hindering an investigation, prosecutors might make greater
use of statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 3 (accessory after the fact) and 18 U.S.C. § 4
(misprision of a felony). °
257. Griffith raises similar arguments in his proposal for D&O disclosure. See id. at 1182-
85.
258. Ronen also proposes disclosure for Financial Statement Insurance. Ronen, supra note
44, at 48-49 (describing "flight to quality" that occurs when companies realize that their
policies will signal quality of their financial statements and controls).
259. See Bharara, supra note 2, at 107. "[T]he elimination of all criminal liability for
business entities would completely eviscerate prosecutors' leverage against corporations to
obtain incriminating information about individual miscreants." Id.
260. 18 U.S.C. § 3 states in pertinent part:
Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has been committed,
receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his
apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact. . . . [An
accessory after the fact shall be imprisoned not more than one-half the maximum
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It is also helpful to remember that the prosecutors' main implement in the "war" on
white collar crimes is not the corporation's "cooperation," but rather the testimony of
whistleblowers and coconspirators, buttressed by the writings contained in company
documents. Scott Sullivan, not entity liability, led to the successful conviction of
Bernard Ebbers for defrauding Worldcom's shareholders, and Andrew Fastow
performed the same service where Ken Lay and Jeffrey Skilling were concerned.
(Indeed, Enron had ceased to exist by the time Lay and Skilling were tried for their
crimes.)
In the one recent case where a company, the law firm of Milberg Weiss, refused to
cooperate and was indicted as a result, the company's refusal did not appear to make
any dent in the government's case. Regardless of Milberg Weiss' lack of assistance,
the government was able to obtain guilty pleas from one of the firm's partners, David
Bershad, who was expected to testify in the prosecution of his law partners, who
ultimately pleaded guilty to the charged conspiracy. 261 The Milberg episode
demonstrates that although prosecutors might like companies to bend over backwards
to identify (and even pressure) suspected wrongdoer-employees, the government is by
no means dependent on companies to do so.
2. Limits of Coverage
Even if politicians and courts agreed that the public policy exception against
insuring criminal conduct should not apply to organizations, there still would be
organizational limits to the types of business entities that could take advantage of
compliance insurance. Partnerships and closely held corporations, for example, might
be ineligible for coverage or might find themselves restricted to coverage for crimes
committed by non-partners or non-shareholders. This is unfortunate because the
innocent partners and shareholders in closely held organizations have far more to lose
than public shareholders in the event criminal conduct takes place. Following detection
of a criminal event, partners may lose all of their personal assets, and shareholders of
closely held corporations could quickly find their shares inalienable. On the other
hand, members of smaller firms presumably have better ability to monitor and prevent
criminal conduct by their peers.262
term of imprisonment or... fined not more than one-half the maximum fine
prescribed for the punishment of the principal.
18 U.S.C. § 4 states in pertinent part:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a
court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known
the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the
United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three
years, or both.
261. See Julie Creswell, Ex-Partner at Milberg Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2007, at Cl. For the plea agreement, see Plea Agreement for Defendant David J.
Bershad, No. CR 05-587(B) JFW (C.A.C.D. July 9, 2007), available at http://www.nylawyer.
comadgifs/decisions/071007bershad-agreement.pdf. Bershad's plea agreement was followed
by William Lerach's and Melvin Weiss' guilty pleas. See Anthony Lin, Weiss Agrees to Plead
Guilty to Role in Kickback Scheme, NEW YORK L.J., March 21, 2008, at 1.
262. Smaller organizations, however, may not need compliance insurance. Cf Clifford G.
Holderness, Liability Insurers as Corporate Monitors, 10 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 115, 124
(1990) (finding from review of 1979 data that smaller closely-held organizations and
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3. How and If Carriers Would Monitor Insureds
Two related questions that arise from this proposal are how carriers would assess
risk and whether risk would be reduced or simply shifted onto those carriers. For many
lines of insurance, the carrier foregoes intensive investigation and instead places the
insured in a particular risk pool based on certain basic characteristics and the carrier's
actuarial tables.263 Other lines of insurance, such as title insurance and the proposed
financial statement insurance, presume an investigatory audit by the carrier. 
264
It is premature to say which approach would be more amenable to compliance
insurance. On one hand, a full-scale audit might provide greater guidance ex ante to
corporations on how to improve monitoring and corporate governance. Such audits,
however, would cost money, and those costs would be reflected in expensive
premiums. 265 Moreover, if investigation yielded insufficient returns in predicting
whether an organization's employees would commit crime, then carriers should be
permitted (and in fact encouraged) to use other less expensive methods of predicting
risk. 266 However, as Professor Cunningham points out, risk pooling is ineffective when
the insured's risks are dependent on each other. In other words, if the risk of
noncompliance rises for all companies due to some cultural event, then pooling fails to
diminish risk.2 67 Given the different types of noncompliance that may beset different
companies, one would expect carriers to find a way to establish a workable pool.
In addition, the empirical evidence of what carriers actually do, as opposed to what
they should do, is mixed. In two forthcoming articles, Professors Baker and Griffith
report on extensive interviews with over forty participants in the D&O market. Baker
and Griffith's articles are particularly relevant because one might expect D&O carriers
to be the carriers who sold compliance insurance, either as a separate policy or as an
extension of the D&O policy. (One could also imagine compliance insurance as an
extension of the corporation's general commercial liability policy.) In any event, Baker
and Griffith's inquiry as to the actions and views of D&O carriers is relevant insofar as
D&O insurance extends to the wrongful conduct of managers.
As a result of their interviews, Baker and Griffith conclude that D&O carriers do
investigate the corporate governance characteristics of potential insureds, and that
carriers do build these characteristics into the price of the carrier's D&O premium.
268
This demonstrates that carriers could presumably take on the role of insuring corporate
liability for crime. In writing their D&O or general commercial liability policies,
partnerships do not purchase D&O insurance).
263. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail, supra note 222, at 1743 ("Most insurance underwriting
exercises involve classifying risks using general actuarial tools rather than specific
investigation.").
264. Id. at 1743-44 (listing other products in which carriers rely on specific investigation).
265. For example, for FSI, Professor Cunningham presumes that insurers would hire external
auditors to assess the reliability of the corporation's financial statements. Id. at 1744.
266. Indeed, we might learn through a compliance insurance regime that it is simply
impossible to reduce certain risks of employee crime in certain sectors or industries beyond a
certain point. If so, the costs of that crime should simply be internalized and expressed as a cost
of doing business, rather than cited as cause for moral shame and massive penalties.
267. Id. at 1740.
268. Baker & Griffith, Predicting Governance Risk, supra note 227, at 489.
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carriers could simply expand the inquiries that they already make and price the
additional risk into their policies.
Unfortunately, in a second article, Baker and Griffith also report that although D&O
carriers price corporate governance into their policies, they explicitly do not monitor
insureds during the life of the policy. 269 Although carriers monitor insureds in other
contexts, including commercial liability policies, they do not engage in similar conduct
for D&O policies because corporate managers are unwilling to pay for the
monitoring. 270 Thus, D&O insurance does not reduce risk; rather, it simply
redistributes it to carriers. Since shareholders could just as easily distribute that risk by
diversifying their portfolio, Baker and Griffith conclude that D&O insurance
encourages agency shirking by managers and should not be purchased.27'
Baker and Griffith theorize that agency costs are behind the managers' purchase of
D&O insurance-minus-monitoring. In other words, managers benefit from an insurance
policy that caps the company's exposure and protects their own position and
compensation, but simultaneously shields them from the monitoring and intervention
that D&O carriers might otherwise provide on behalf of shareholders. 272 Although
Baker and Griffith theorize that the lack of D&O monitoring may also result partially
from other factors, including futility or prohibitive cost of monitoring, lack of
monitoring expertise, D&O carriers' fears of liability for mistakes in monitoring
advice, and various market failures, they still conclude that agency costs are the
primary reason that public corporations decline the carriers' loss intervention services
in the D&O context.273
Baker and Griffith's analysis is daunting to say the least. If D&O insurance can be
replicated through portfolio diversification without cost, then what does that say about
the current proposal for compliance insurance? Would managers simply use the
compliance insurance as a means for smoothing risks and further shirking their
fiduciary duties?
Hopefully not. Baker and Griffith's analysis is not addressed directly to the topic of
corporate compliance, and as a result they fail to consider several explanations besides
agency costs that might explain the current lack of interest in D&O monitoring.
First, corporations may be rationally engaging in the perverse behavior that
Professors Arlen and Kraakman identified with regard to corporate criminal liability.
274
In other words, if a corporation perceives that a carrier's monitoring will simply
increase detection of wrongdoing without a corresponding benefit for such detection in
terms of lessened penalties, then firms will choose not to monitor. Although firms
nominally receive credit for monitoring and detection under the McNulty Memo and
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, these standards are quite vague and subject to
little or no oversight. Thus, one would expect the perverse incentives identified by
Arlen and Kraakman to continue to play some role. Moreover, because criminal
269. Baker & Griffith, Missing Monitor, supra note 252, at 1813.
270. According to Baker and Griffith, the one carrier of which they were aware that made an
attempt to specialize in loss prevention could not demonstrate the value of their services and
eventually left the D&O market. Id. at 1810-11.
271. Id. at 1822.
272. Id. at 1833-34.
273. Id. at 1840-41.
274. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
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liability is so devastating, the company might reasonably worry that by involving a
carrier in the process, it would effectively relinquish control over how it handled
questionable violations of law and how and when it would bring those violations to the
attention of both government authorities and the public.
Second, even where pure prevention services are concerned, various formal and
informal regulations already require public corporations to purchase corporate
compliance services from lawyers, accountants, and other personnel. Although
insurance carriers may indeed be the more efficient architects of compliance because
they are bound financially by their mistakes, they are not currently favored over
lawyers, compliance consultants, and accountants by regulators and prosecutors.
Accordingly, the advice that a corporation currently purchases from an insurance
carrier either may be duplicative of the advice that it is already receiving or in conflict
with that advice. If it is duplicative, the corporation may choose not to purchase the
advice even if a carrier could provide such advice more cheaply because the
corporation perceives regulators and prosecutors prefer its current stable of advisors. If
the carrier's advice is in conflict with the other compliance experts, the corporation
will ignore it because under the current regulatory environment, the governance advice
preferred by prosecutors and regulators will be the advice that the corporation adopts,
regardless of whether that advice is in fact correct. 275
Finally, fear of an evidentiary paper trail might also derail interest in carrier
monitoring. For example, following a carrier's audit, a carrier might offer the
corporation a reduced premium in exchange for an alteration in a particular method of
governance. In the current environment, however, the corporation might fear that its
rejection of that method, although completely reasonable and permissible under the
business judgment rule, would result in significantly higher penalties in subsequent
civil or criminal litigation.
In sum, the lack of monitoring by D&O carriers may result from factors other than
agency costs or market failures; it should not, by itself, derail further inquiry into the
possibility of compliance insurance.
4. Lack of a Market
A separate challenge is whether a sufficient number of private carriers would enter
the compliance insurance market at all.
Private carriers might reasonably conclude that insuring entities for intentional
wrongs is either too risky or too likely to encourage moral hazard. Similarly, carriers
might write policies whose premiums and deductibles are so high as to offer little
275. Another possibility is that shareholders want their agents to purchase D&O insurance-
minus-monitoring because: (1) they know that their agents inflate the company's books; and (2)
they believe that they will, on average, benefit from their agents' fraud. If they believe that they
will benefit from such fraud, they will prefer a policy that caps wealth transfers to loser
shareholders, but still permits their agents the latitude to continue inflating the books. By
contrast, portfolio diversification zeroes out the shareholders' wins and losses. D&O insurance-
minus-monitoring preserves benefits for "winner" shareholders, which they willingly share with
their agents. Although this theory would undermine some of my arguments against corporate
criminal liability (shareholders are usually viewed as innocents), it does not seem particularly
plausible beyond a small portion of traders who are particularly savvy and enjoy risk.
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coverage to the insured. Moreover, we know from experience that the insurance
industry has endured cycles of "hard" markets (where premiums are high and coverage
is difficult to obtain) and "soft" markets (where premiums are low and coverage terms
are cheaper and more desirable).276
There are several possible answers to this problem. To the extent carriers were
concerned about moral hazard, several provisions would continue to deter individuals
from intentional wrongful misconduct. First and most important, this proposal
presumes that individual criminal liability would continue unabated. Whereas directors
and officers may not harbor much personal financial worry with regard to securities
shareholder litigation,277 officers and directors do harbor real fears of jail and fines,
and they should continue to harbor those fears.2 7 8
As for carriers' fears of excessive penalties, carriers could reduce their overall
exposure by reinsuring the risks. Moreover, similar to casualty and property insurance,
corporations that offered the greatest risks presumably would spread their coverage
279
over several carriers.
5. Overly Concentrated Market
Even if a market formed, it is possible that it would come to be dominated by a few
players. Concentrated markets could pose several problems. Insurance carriers might
collude and agree to carve up the market and extract excessive premiums from
potential corporate clients or price some clients out of the market altogether.
Although the possibility of a concentrated market is a concern, it still represents an
improvement over the current system, which grants the federal prosecutor a monopoly.
Firms presumably would prefer to pay an expensive premium over the combined costs
of an inefficient compliance program and the risks of an exorbitant DPA or criminal
prosecution.
276. See Sean M. Fitzpatrick, Fear is the Key: A Behavioral Guide to Underwriting Cycles,
10 CONN. INS. L. J. 255, 259 (2004) ("[Pjricing volatility and periodic constrictions of supply
will be inevitable in the insurance market, as insurers react to unforeseen changes in the
underlying liability environment that affect policies written in earlier periods, or simply to
having 'guessed wrong' in their pricing in a stable liability environment.").
277. Coffee, supra note 115, at 1550 (explaining that the corporate entity and the insurer
ordinarily pay entire amount in securities litigation). In fact, one of the exceptions to this rule is
when individual defendants have been prosecuted criminally. Id. at 1551.
278. Officers, however, do sometimes face civil liabilities in excess of their insurance
coverage. Id. at 1577.
279. See Baker & Griffith, Predicting Governance Risk, supra note 227, at 504 (describing
"towers" of coverage, which are essentially "separate layers of insurance policies stacked to
reach a desired total amount of insurance coverage"). According to Baker and Griffith, the
layering of coverage may decrease each carrier's incentive to monitor the insured's corporate
governance practices because the costs of the monitoring are borne solely by the monitoring
carrier while the benefits are spread to all layers of insurance. Baker & Griffith, Missing
Monitor, supra note 252, at 1811 n.72, 1839.
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6. Overdeterrence
Some might worry that eventually, insurance carriers would extract the same
overpayment through premiums that prosecutors extract through DPAs. This problem
may be magnified if the employee responsible for purchasing the insurance, the
organization's risk manager, purchases excess coverage or authorizes excess premiums
because she is risk adverse or overly worried about her career.
280
If carriers and risk managers are as risk adverse as prosecutors, what benefit is there
to having a market for compliance insurance? There are several. As an initial matter,
risk managers should be no worse than the compliance "experts" and regulators who
urge corporations to adopt costly compliance mechanisms regardless of their
effectiveness. To the contrary, because carriers are bonded financially to their
governance advice, they have little to gain from demanding showy (but ineffective)
monitoring systems. 281 Finally, insofar as entity liability under this system is civil, the
extralegal consequences of a criminal conviction drop out. Accordingly, carriers will
write policies that insure against the costs of all civil liabilities, but not the criminal
costs that organizations currently self-insure. Finally, as discussed above, unlike
prosecutors or judges, carriers are at least partially constrained by a market and,
therefore, are less likely to be able to get away with systematically demanding
overpriced premiums.
Another concern might be that insurance carriers are as prone to command and
control systems as lawyers, judges, and compliance professionals. The evidence from
the D&O market, however, seems to suggest otherwise. According to Professors Baker
and Griffith, D&O carriers carefully assess risk by reviewing and considering the
corporate entity's culture and character because psychologists have identified these
characteristics as the most relevant to encouraging corporate compliance.
282
7. Underdeterrence
The opposing concern is that the insurance system would underdeter corporate
crime as a result of carriers being captured or conflicted.
Following the fall of Enron and the detection of similar corporate reporting
scandals, observers commented that auditors compromised their independence and
failed to report or detect fraudulent financial statements because they were focused on
retaining clients for their consultation services.28 3 Consequently, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 prescribes auditors from offering consultation services to clients.
284
Although similar legislation could prevent Underwriter U from offering consulting
services to C Corp, a slightly different conflict arises in the insurance context because
insurance companies presumably sell insurance products other than Compliance
Insurance. Thus, there is a possibility that an underwriter might underprice its
Compliance Insurance premium in order to maintain or increase business in other
insurance markets. (This would presume that the other markets are sufficiently less
280. See Baker & Griffith, Missing Monitor, supra note 252, at 1833-34.
281. Indeed, this is why they are the preferred monitor. See id. at 1834-35.
282. Baker & Griffith, Predicting Governance Risk, supra note 227, at 516-25.
283. Ronen, supra note 44, at 47.
284. See Title II of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
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concentrated). Similarly, if the insurer had a long-term relationship with the same
corporate entity over a long period of time, the insurer might lose its objectivity and
adopt the views and needs of its client. This phenomenon is often referred to as
capture. Capture and conflict both undermine the third party monitor's independence.
At first blush, the threat of capture and conflict appear less prevalent than in the
auditor context. Unlike auditors, who might systematically ignore or miscalculate the
risk that they will be held liable for financial misstatements, insurers are in the
business of affirmatively calculating and accepting financial risks.28 5 Moreover,
carriers are bonded not just by their reputation, but by their capital. Capture therefore
seems far less likely.286
As for the concern that the carrier will purposely underprice compliance insurance
in order to obtain the customer's business in more competitive lines of insurance, this
becomes a problem only if the carrier itself lacks minimum solvency to pay the costs of
C Corp's suboptimal deterrence. In other words, if Underwriter U underprices too
many compliance insurance policies, sooner or later it will become responsible for
paying the greater liabilities that result from its practices.
8. Administrative Costs
A final potential argument against compliance insurance is that it would generate
administrative costs that outweighed the benefits of dismantling corporate criminal
liability.
Some of the costs of reviewing the organization's compliance program have already
been absorbed by the corporation's D&O and general commercial liability
premiums.287 If coverage were expanded, however, to include insurance for entities as
a result of employees' intentional wrongs, substantial transaction costs might accrue,
particularly at the contracting stage, when experience was lacking, terms were ill-
defined ex ante, and both sides were unsure how courts would interpret coverage terms
ex post.288 Over time, as both parties gained experience with these types of policies,
however, these costs would abate. This proposal does assume, however, that the costs
285. Moreover, one might argue that auditors systematically ignored risks because the
"capital" they gave up-their reputation-was hard to define or calculate. See Coffee, Gatekeeper
Reform, supra note 45, at 326.
286. Professor Griffith has argued:
Insurance companies are experts at assessing risk. Because the success of an
insurer's business depends upon taking in more capital than it pays out, the insurer
must develop an ability to assess the probable payout obligations of each exposure
and then charge an appropriate premium for the risk.... D&O underwriters
therefore ought to develop categories of high risk corporate governance and low
risk corporate governance and, in a well-working insurance market, seek to price
and sell their policies at least partly on that basis.
Griffith, supra note 44, at 1174.
287. Moreover, carriers already evaluate compliance risk insofar as they may be liable under
D&O policies for the follow-on civil suits that are filed after the announcement of criminal
charges.
288. Coverage disputes between insureds and carriers would further increase these costs. See
Cox, supra note 227, at 32 (discussing D&O coverage disputes and their effect on
management).
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of supplying uncertain contractual terms in insurance policies are dwarfed by the costs
imposed by the DOJ's internal charging policies and the uncertainty that flows from
them.
CONCLUSION
The current system of corporate criminal liability results in overpayment by
corporate entities that are subject to an extremely broad criminal liability rule and
which rightfully fear the extralegal penalties of indictment. Overpayment, in turn,
results in social inefficiency and may reduce compliance across organizations. An
insurance system, in contrast, creates a market for compliance and places insurance
carriers-who already assess corporate compliance risks in the D&O arena-in the
position of judging corporate compliance programs ex ante instead of prosecutors who
review compliance ex post with an eye to coercing organizations to assist in
prosecuting individual employees.
Preventing corporate crime is and will remain an important topic for private and
public entities alike. Just as communities have been unable to find ways to prevent
their citizens from transgressing deeply held norms of what is right and wrong, so have
organizations failed to prevent their employees from breaking the law. That failure is
unlikely to change any time soon.
Insurance may not be the final answer on preventing socially undesirable behavior
within corporate firms. It does, however, provide a promising framework for further
discussion of how we might go about reforming corporate criminal law.
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